The programme – managed by the Independent Development Trust (IDT) and which would have cost over R1.6-billion – was meant to deliver long-overdue upgrades to key hospitals. Instead, it has been dogged by allegations of fraud, mismanagement and irregularities.

Spearheading the programme is NDOH director general Dr Sandile Buthelezi, who informed the IDT that the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between them had been terminated.

The August 2025 letter, declared that the department was “dissatisfied with the progress made and the results of projects that have been undertaken”.

The IDT, however, has hit back in its responses to amaBhungane, alleging that it was the health department that failed to provide necessary oversight, give instructions and transfer money on time.

Yet while the NDOH is now scrutinising the IDT, it has appeared far less willing to confront Buthelezi’s own role – with damning allegations against him in connection with two projects now under scrutiny – as well as his relationship with now suspended IDT CEO, Tebogo Malaka.

Amid the spat, some critical projects have grind to a halt, with one contractor writing to Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, for intervention in a hospital upgrade already delayed by more than a year.

Timing

The timing of Buthelezi’s correspondence to the acting IDT CEO Carmen-Joy Abraham, is questionable. His first letter was sent on 22 August 2025 – 22 days after Malaka’s suspension.

Just three weeks later, he terminated the MOU and announced an investigation.

Until then, warnings about procurement failures and mismanagement had seemingly been allowed to fester with little visible intervention from the NDOH, our reporting suggests.

NDOH spokesperson, Foster Mohale, disputed this, saying the department had been conducting oversight “to the extent [that] the ability and capability can allow”.

He said the DG “is now acting in line with the responsibilities of all Accounting Officers”.

“The Department did not allow the flourishing of issues but has been proactive and numerous correspondences have been sent to the IDT since its appointment as an Implementing Agent… that is why we are taking action.”

On the potential irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure, Mohale said if the IDT “execute [sic] their mandate in such a way that the department incurs a finding, this will be revealed in the Auditor General’s report”.

Buthelezi played a central role in the irregular R836-million oxygen procurement process, allegedly working alongside Malaka to push the deal through despite serious red flags.

Audit firm PwC was appointed to investigate the project and singled Buthelezi out for this very action, even though it was not mandated to probe the NDOH.

But Mohale said that the department “did not hire” Malaka and its only relationship with the IDT was as an implementing agent.

Malaka was placed on suspension after PwC found she was responsible for a number of procedural and oversight failures.

According to IDT spokesperson, Lerato Modisana, Malaka’s hearing is set to continue in the first week of February 2026.

Modisana said, as a result of PwC’s findings, one official has already been dismissed and two others – former spokesperson Phasha Makgolane and general manager for supply chain management, Dr Molebedi Sisi – have been charged and suspended.

Mohale said the Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, requested that the Minister of Public Works, Dean Macpherson, extend the PwC investigation to include officials in the NDOH, including the director general, and that they are still waiting on the outcome.

Macpherson, confirmed this in press briefing last Thursday, saying the full report could not yet be released “so as not to compromise criminal action that may result from it”.

Buthelezi is also at the centre of a Hawks investigation into allegations that he solicited a R500 000 bribe from a construction company, Base Major working on the Tambo Memorial Hospital project – which the IDT later awarded one of the very contracts now under scrutiny.

Hawks spokesperson, Brigadier Brig Nomthandazo Mbambo, told amaBhungane that “the docket in this matter is still with NPA. No one has been formally charged as we are still awaiting decision by the DPP”.

Despite numerous attempts, the NPA did not respond to amaBhungane’s request for an update on the matter.

The NDOH spokesperson told amaBhungane only that if Buthelezi is found guilty of soliciting a bribe, “action will be taken”.

Delayed due diligence

In his 22 August 2025 letter to IDT’s Abraham, Buthelezi spelled out a litany of problems that, despite being years in the making, seemingly had only now triggered decisive action.

The hospital refurbishment programme began in 2022, and the red flags should have been apparent almost from inception.

Buthelezi noted issues with stage one planning, non-performing contractors, the absence of some elements of the implementation plan and the failure of some projects to meet National Treasury’s infrastructure planning guidelines.

Yet, while the IDT is responsible for procurement and project management, NDOH officials are also involved at every step.

The health department has the ultimate responsibility over the programme and appointments, changes to the scope of the projects, work verification and payments cannot be done without its go-ahead.

In the letter Buthelezi detailed concerning instances of contractors being paid for work not done, conflicts of interest and no approved plans in place before work began.

Yet, money continued to flow, risking irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure.

He provided instances of conflicts of interest regarding contractors, advance payments for work not completed on Harry Gwala and Tambo Memorial hospitals, the failure of the IDT to provide updates on risks, delays, payments and projections as well as underspending of the budget.

“Risk identification practices have fallen short of industry norms, specifically when considering the size of some of these projects and the substantial risks associated with the contracting methods applied,” Buthelezi said.

But according to IDT spokesperson, Modisana, “Ultimate financial stewardship and accountability for the programme reside exclusively with the NDOH.”

She said the IDT consistently aimed to prevent irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure and had taken steps to protect the state from financial exposure, even when strict PFMA compliance slowed operational work.

“The IDT welcomes legitimate oversight but must correct any inaccuracies that risk misrepresenting prudent financial management and statutory compliance as wrongdoing,” she said.

Modisana contended that payments referenced by Buthelezi were “lawful infrastructure payments”, arguing that the IDT had in fact withheld payments where the NDOH delayed approvals or failed to transfer funds – measures she described as necessary PFMA compliance.

The NDOH also incurred significant delays for major projects particularly due to the department delaying mandatory approvals, Modisana added.

“While the impact on contractors is regrettable, the causation rests entirely with the entity holding exclusive approval and funding authority: the NDOH.”

Probe

In a subsequent letter to Abraham, Buthelezi confirmed that the department is in the process of procuring a service provider to conduct a due diligence investigation into six hospital projects.

The probe would look into, among other things, whether:

• the IDT adhered to procurement policies;
• bid committees were properly constituted and bidder disqualifications justified;
• bidding processes were equitable, transparent and cost-effective;
• project prices were market-related and reasonable;
• projects were managed in line with agreements, contracts and industry standards; and
• expenditure incurred aligned with actual progress.

“The department accordingly requests your full support and cooperation with the appointed service provider, including granting access to all documentation required to conclude this process in an efficient and timely manner,” Buthelezi wrote.

Mohale told amaBhungane that audit firm Thabi Consulting would be conducting the probe.

‘Situation deteriorating’

Caught in the middle of the spat, however, are contractors reckoning with nonpayment and an angry community.

In November, the situation became so dire for Powerchoice Group – contracted to build an orthopaedic unit at Witbank Hospital – that it wrote to Motsoaledi pleading for intervention.

“It has come to our attention, through members of the Emalahleni community, that certain officials within the NDOH have communicated that a decision has been taken by the office of the director general to halt payments to the main contractor,” director Andile Somana said in a letter shared with amaBhungane by a community stakeholder.

“As a result, the Department has reportedly decided not to transfer funds to IDT for the settlement of Powerchoice Group’s approved invoices.”

He added, “Despite our attempts to engage all relevant stakeholders, it has become apparent that the project has been effectively abandoned.”

Powerchoice asked the Minister for his assistance to facilitate payments after, it said, the NDOH had not transferred the funds to the IDT.

“The non-payment has caused severe distress among local labourers and subcontractors, many of whom have begun removing valuable equipment from the site to secure their wages,” he said.

The situation on the ground was deteriorating, Somana told the Minister, as workers were facing threats from the community and suppliers “who believe we are withholding their payments”.

“We therefore make an earnest plea for your immediate intervention to resolve this matter. The escalating frustration of the community and suppliers is becoming both palpable and uncontrollable, and urgent action is required to prevent further unrest and protect public assets.”

At a press briefing held by the company alongside community stakeholders in early November, a representative of Powerchoice told amaBhungane this was due to internal problems “caused by the NDOH not paying the IDT”.

They added that their last payment was received in May this year but, in July 2025, Buthelezi then issued an instruction to the IDT to terminate Powerchoice’s contract “without due process”.

“The current status of the project is really undesirable, the project is 60% complete but it has started to deteriorate as it has stopped for five months now.”

The construction of the orthopaedic unit involved complex work on three floors, but the project was also beset by changes in design, reinstalling and fixing work and a turnstile of subcontractors appointed and terminated, according to the company.

The project is now overdue by more than a year with 44% of the total contract value claimed by the contractor.

AmaBhungane visited the site and found the bare bones of unfinished work still far off from being completed.

Large boxes of transformers and solar batteries – costing about R1.4-million – still sat, unused, on site. Cabling and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning installations were almost complete, the company said, but then stalled months ago.

Powerchoice said it was waiting on payment for about R31-million for work it completed.

Mohale did not respond to amaBhungane’s request for comment on Powerchoice’s complaints, but according to Buthelezi’s letter to Abraham, the company had been performing poorly since the start of the project and penalties had been partially imposed.

Powerchoice, however, deny this, saying it never received a notice of poor performance.

The post Health director general, IDT clash over critical R1.6-billion hospital programme as contractor seeks minister’s intervention appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.

Read the updated article here: https://amabhungane.org/idt-mistrust-part-1-how-minister-zikalala-and-his-comrade-chair-mshengu-nixed-probes-into-ceo-malaka/

Following a ruling by Deputy Press Ombud Tyrone August, amaBhungane has updated Part One of this series to reflect the outcome of a High Court ruling in Moepathutse’s favour, dated May 2025 and traversed in Part Two of this series. 

The Ombud ruled against most of the complaints by Moepathutse but found that amaBhungane erred by not including some details of the court ruling that favoured Moepathutse. For the full ruling, see: https://presscouncil.org.za/2025/09/22/moepathutse-property-investments-and-directors-vs-amabhungane/

The post Update following Moepathutse complaint to Press Ombud appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.

Following reporting by amaBhungane and Daily Maverick, which raised numerous red flags about the IDT’s adjudication and prompted a PwC investigation into the Pressure Swing Adsorption (PSA) tender, Motsoaledi pledged to terminate the IDT-managed process and purported to have it transferred to the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) to oversee afresh. 

The IDT had awarded some 55 hospital sites split between two bidders: Bulkeng, which was awarded a contract for R428-million, and Maziya, which was awarded a contract worth R152-million. 

Now it has emerged that the Maziya contract has remained in place with the IDT, despite the initial claim that the DBSA would take over, review and likely rerun the whole process.

While the DBSA has gone on open tender for a new contractor, it appears that the Maziya contract, covering some ten hospital sites, has somehow been excluded from the transfer and instead has been handed back to the IDT to manage.

When and why this happened is not clear.

‘Left as it was’

Spokesperson for the National Department of Health (NDOH), Foster Mohale, told amaBhungane the health minister had asked that the whole PSA project be transferred to the DBSA. 

“After the transfer, the DBSA then advised that the Maziya contract should not be transferred to them because at that time nobody had yet alleged any anomaly, malfeasance or flaws regarding the Maziya contract. 

“The DBSA was worried that, legally, Maziya could interdict the process and stop the DBSA from executing the whole PSA project. That would have defeated the whole process of our hospitals producing their own oxygen timeously. The Maziya contract was then left as it was.”

Yet this explanation doesn’t add up.

Firstly, neither the department nor the DBSA would say whether they had taken legal advice about the probity of the Maziya contract, or the risk of litigation should it be cancelled like the Bulkeng one was. Neither did they indicate that Maziya had threatened legal action.

Both amaBhungane’s investigations – and the summary of the PwC report released by Public Works minister Dean Macpherson – raised concerns about flaws in the whole tender process run by the IDT. It resulted in the awards to both Maziya and Bulkeng, although most of the material issues flagged focused on Bulkeng. 

Secondly, the contract signed between the NDOH and DBSA as recently as 12 August 2025 made provision for the entire IDT project to be handed over to the DBSA, including the hospital sites previously awarded to Maziya. 

The contract also provided for an option for the DBSA to retain service providers previously appointed by IDT – such as Maziya.

The contract states, “This must only be done after the DBSA has conducted due diligence on the procurement processes of the Service Providers appointed by IDT and their performance. The cession process needs the endorsement of NDOH”.

In other words, if the Maziya award was above board, then the DBSA was free to simply take over the existing contract with Maziya. 

Yet this did not happen, and the DBSA failed to answer our question as to whether they did conduct this due diligence before deciding not to take over Maziya’s contract.

Neither is it clear that NDOH and DBSA have concluded a written and signed variation to the contract as required. 

The version shared with amaBhungane on 18 September 2025 – along with the statement confirming Maziya’s contract remained “as it was” – still confers on the DBSA responsibility for all 55 sites. 

Maziya told us, “Our bid, and our subsequent contract as the Maziya On-Site Gas Systems Joint Venture concluded with the IDT thereafter, being found to be above reproach and untainted, which in turn is the reason why such contract still subsists, uncancelled”.

Perhaps no fault can be laid at Maziya’s door, yet amaBhungane’s review of IDT’s award process shows chaotic procurement, shifting costs and nonsensical hospital allocations.

The IDT did not respond to our questions.

Red flags

Funded by the Global Fund, the plan’s projected budget ballooned from R216-million to R836-million. 

According to the IDT, this final total budget encompassed contractor costs as well as maintenance costs for a 36-month period and was inclusive of all applicable fees (i.e. professional consultants), IDT management fees and VAT.

Amid the cost surge, we found that Bulkeng, the larger contractor, appeared to have falsified signatures, used an Original Equipment Manufacturer’s South African Health Products Regulatory Authority (SAHPRA) certificate without authorisation and lacked the necessary Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) grading to carry out the work. 

Days after amaBhungane interviewed Bulkeng’s director, Nkosinathi Ndlovu, he was found dead. Police are still investigating.

But the concerns were not limited to Bulkeng.

As amaBhungane’s own reporting revealed, an August 2023 meeting held by the project’s steering committee decided that it would be best to restart the whole procurement process, citing the major cost escalations and problems with the tender specifications. They were ignored.

Despite internal warnings to restart the process, then-IDT CEO Tebogo Malaka (now suspended) and Health DG Dr Sandile Buthelezi pushed the deal through. 

PwC’s report described missing minutes, incomplete committees, undocumented scoring and opaque negotiations.

Public works minister, Dean Macpherson, later said the IDT inflated the budget “without a single documented approval or value-for-money assessment.” 

Disciplinary action was recommended against Malaka, supply chain head Dr Molebedi Sisi, and several IDT officials.

A November 2024 internal probe by Public Works flagged further discrepancies, noting Bulkeng was awarded 45 sites for R428-million and Maziya just 10 sites for R152-million, without explanation for the disparity. The report called for a “comprehensive investigation” into both appointments.

Maziya’s bid and evaluation

AmaBhungane’s review of Maziya’s bid and some IDT internal documents available to us showed not only inflated prices but also that it was initially allocated hospitals it hadn’t bid for. 

To give an idea of the inflation in relation to Maziya, amaBhungane compared the IDT’s 2022 implementation plan, the NDOH’s second concurrence letter approving inflated project costs in February 2024, and Maziya’s original quotes according to a bid submission from 27 September 2023. 

The original implementation plan included estimates for “small, medium and large” plants, which were later changed to 20, 30 and 40 normal cubic meters per hour (nm/h) plants. In the highly technical business of PSA oxygen plants, it is unclear what the original sizes referred to and why a more thorough job wasn’t done from the outset. 

At Greytown Hospital in Kwa-Zulu Natal, the original estimate was R4.2-million. Maziya quoted R17.6-million for a 40nm/h plant and settled on R12.5-million. Bulkeng quoted R16.8-million for the same hospital. 

Maziya’s COO, Lucky Qotoyi, told amaBhungane that they “are on record that Maziya Onsite cannot comment on Greytown Hospital as we didn’t tender for that site”.

For Bethesda Hospital, also in KZN, Maziya quoted R25-million for a smaller 25nm/h plant, while the estimate placed it at R2.8-million. The final amount was to be awarded at R12.5-million. 

For Elim Hospital in Limpopo, Bulkeng quoted just over R3-million for one 40nm/h plant – less than the original estimate at R4.2-million. According to the 7 September 2023 executive bid adjudication committee (EBAC) submission, this was a mistake. Maziya quoted R17.9-million for the same hospital. It was originally awarded to Bulkeng for R12-million in 2024 and then to Maziya for the same price. It is not clear how the final bidder and price was negotiated. 

Based on original quotes, Maziya’s bid per hospital was only slightly cheaper than Bulkeng’s even though Maziya did not bid for four provinces. Subsequent to these documents, however, Maziya was awarded a different set of hospitals. 

However, its path to a final award still had unexplained discrepancies.

A chaotic process 

In September 2023, Maziya was allocated 46 hospitals, including 15 it never bid for. 

Then, in October 2023, Maziya had been allocated five of the most expensive hospitals before that was brought down to just one in February 2024. 

According to a formal letter of 16 January 2024 from the IDT to the NDOH requesting approval of the changed budget and preselected contractors, at that stage, Maziya was allocated only one site, Greytown, whereas every other site was allocated to Bulkeng.

This lopsided award prompted the NDOH chief financial officer, Phaswa Mamogale, to write on the bid approval form when he signed off on 14 February 2024 that, “As risk mitigation IDT should appoint multiple service providers in future to prevent/avoid dependencies on [a] single provider.”

It’s by no means clear how Maziya went from one site in February to 10 sites in June 2024.

In addition, Mamogale queried what had happened to a third bidder, Powerchoice, which had apparently also made it through the adjudication process, but mysteriously dropped out. 

That exit has never been explained, and Powerchoice told amaBhungane that it was “also in the dark”.

More money

Now, almost a year later, the NDOH has again attempted to justify the ballooning costs, but the IDT previously gave different reasons for the cost increase. 

The IDT previously blamed inflation, VAT, and maintenance costs dating back to 2017 and 2019 estimates. The NDOH now claims the Global Fund simply gave more money, expanding the project from 30 to 60 hospitals.

This, however, contradicts early planning documentation, and the 2022 implementation plan – signed by both NDOH and IDT officials – which had already put the project cost at R216-million for 60 hospitals. 

Mohale said the Global Fund then shared their catalogues of PSA oxygen plant prices when the department struggled with their own estimates, and an internal assessment of oxygen demand also justified higher costs.

The Global Fund did not respond to amaBhungane’s requests to confirm the NDOH’s version of events. 

Official intervention

As more allegations surfaced earlier this year, Motsoaledi declared that the contracts would be terminated and transferred the project to DBSA.

On the release of PwC’s report in July, he said, “It must be noted that when this story of the possibility of corruption broke out in the public media, the Minister of Health in consultation with Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure immediately took a decision to remove the tender from the IDT and took it to the DBSA so that the project can continue and deliver the much-needed oxygen.”

Now we know that in the case of Maziya, at least, that didn’t happen. 

What we don’t know is why.

The post Revealed: Maziya’s share in tainted IDT oxygen tender ‘left as it was’ – despite health minister’s promise appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.

Part one of this series showed how Kwazi Mshengu, Zikalala’s confidant and then-IDT chair, led the board in abandoning a National Treasury investigation into the parastatal’s procurement of a new head office lease – even refusing to be briefed on its provisional findings.

Mshengu and the board asked Zikalala to have his Department of Public Works and Infrastructure, of which the IDT is an implementing agency, investigate instead.

The current story shows that while departmental auditors went on to produce a damning report on procedural irregularities, they had also warned Zikalala they were unequipped to probe – and could not investigate – substantive allegations against Malaka and others – a limitation he readily accepted.

Despite the auditors recommending a further probe by the department’s anti-corruption unit, Zikalala instantly wrote to Mshengu endorsing Malaka’s appointment, claiming the auditors had “found no wrongdoing” on her part.

This was on 20 May 2024, just nine days before the national elections that ushered in the government of national unity.

Mshengu signed off on Malaka’s appointment six weeks later, as new ministers – including the DA’s Dean Macpherson, Zikalala’s successor – were being sworn in.

Zikalala’s exoneration had proved decisive for Malaka, whose elevation from acting to permanent chief executive was blocked after she had entered a five-year, R45-million lease with politically connected Moepathutse Property Investments behind the board’s back. This followed a procurement process marred by allegations of favouritism.

Moepathutse, which has denied wrongdoing or any relationship with Malaka, sued the IDT for damages and costs, which the IDT itself estimates amount to almost R14-million, after it failed to occupy the building.

The IDT responded by washing its dirty linen in court. It argued that the lease was invalid because tender specifications had been “tailormade” for Moepathutse’s Irene property and because Malaka had signed without the requisite board authority.

The IDT’s defence took a potentially fatal hit two weeks ago when the Pretoria high court dismissed a review application it had brought to set the lease aside.

The judge found that the IDT had failed to prove the lease was “tainted by any illegality” in any way.

Malaka – despite being heavily conflicted – had deposed the IDT’s founding affidavit.

Malaka has not responded to detailed questions.

Under pressure

In response to amaBhungane’s questions, Zikalala, now deputy to Macpherson, did not address why his endorsement of Malaka had claimed “no wrongdoing” despite the probe’s limited remit.

He said, however, that he had held back Malaka’s appointment for over a year pending the investigations and that she had “engaged in legal challenges through her lawyers relating to [her] appointment”.

Zikalala said that when he became minister in March 2023, his predecessor, Patricia De Lille, had already recommended Malaka to cabinet. “I am the minister who withdrew the [recommendation] for investigations to be conducted.”

As detailed in part one, the board then considered procuring a forensic firm to conduct a probe, but hesitated to entrust the process to IDT management, then led by Malaka in acting capacity. One thing led to another and National Treasury, assisted by law firm ENS, commenced a forensic investigation on the board’s behalf.

Towards the end of the year, a reconstituted board, now chaired by Mshengu, canned the Treasury investigation and asked Zikala to have his department investigate internally instead.

The board’s resolution still targeted Malaka though, calling for Moepathutse’s selection to be probed “specifically relating to the relationship between the lessor and the acting CEO”.

But the new probe was neither forensic nor focused on Malaka.

Zikalala – who said he was committed “to serve with integrity, transparency and accountability” – shared the final report with amaBhungane.

This report shows that the request to investigate had been routed through the department’s inter-governmental relations unit to internal audit, not its governance, risk and compliance (GRC) branch, whose remit includes fraud and corruption investigations.

The audit unit agreed to help, but only with an “assurance audit” to check compliance with control prescripts.  “Internal audit performs assurance audits and not investigations/forensic audits which reside within GRC.”

So concerned were the auditors that the limitations of their approach be understood that they insisted on Zikalala’s approval and board concurrence before they start. “The minister approved the proposed assurance audit approach on the 15^th of March 2024.”

The internal audit chief signed off on her team’s report two months later.

Within its narrow lane, the report was damning.

It was “unable to provide reasonable assurance that the procurement process was fair, transparent and regular”.

It identified multiple gaps in the procurement file and “material non-compliance to procurement policies, laws and regulations”.

However, the report also reiterated that “our audit did not cover the review of conflict of interest of executive management, the board members, [and supply chain management] officials to any bidder, especially to the recommended bidder”.

This, it said, “requires special tools that we do not have”.

The auditors went on to recommend that the board, in consultation with the minister, ask the GRC’s anti-corruption unit after all “to investigate further the areas” they could not cover or where information had been unavailable to them.

No wrongdoing

Zikalala wasted no time, least of all to initiate the deeper investigation.

Instead, on 20 May 2024 – the same day the audit report was signed – Zikalala addressed a letter to Mshengu in his capacity as board chair.

“You will recall the proposal,” he wrote, “to hold in abeyance the matter of the confirmation of Ms Tebogo Malaka … pending the conclusion of the investigation… The investigation by the department has been completed and no wrong-doing was found on the part of Ms Malaka.

“As such, I want to confirm my concurrence to the board’s decision to appoint Ms Malaka as the IDT chief executive officer.”

Zikalala did this knowing his audit team had not probed allegations against Malaka – and despite briefings from the previous board that Treasury had been tasked to do just that.

Zikalala sent the letter nine days before the elections saw the ANC lose its majority and Zikalala his post. Mshengu signed off on Malaka’s appointment on 3 July 2024, the day new ministers, including Macpherson, were sworn in.

Both Mshengu and Zikalala denied there was any connection between their respective actions of canning the Treasury probe, declaring Malaka cleared by the department, and getting her appointed before Macpherson took charge.

Mshengu, whom Macpherson removed from the board, said, “You would also know that IDT is a state entity and its operations are not subject to changes in government.  Therefore, the appointment of Ms Malaka as CEO had nothing to do with changes in government.  In any event, no one knew what would be the outcomes of the national general elections.”

Zikalala said the board had terminated the Treasury investigation of its own accord and that there was “no so-called ‘haste’ on my part” to appoint Malaka. He reiterated that he had ordered investigations after becoming minister and had paused the appointment “for a period of more than a year until there were legal procedures initiated against me as minister.”

Another investigation

Zikalala also stressed that Malaka’s appointment was not the end of the road and that the GRC anti-corruption unit had in fact “commenced its deeper investigation” as recommended by the internal auditors.

That probe only started last November, months after Zikalala was replaced as minister.

The department confirmed that the investigation was concluded in mid-February, but was awaiting the director-general’s sign-off. Its terms of reference included “determining whether there was irregular, improper and/or criminal conduct by IDT official(s) and/or third parties”.

AmaBhungane has submitted a request under the Promotion of Access to Information Act for the canned Treasury investigation reports and will do the same for the anti-corruption unit report.

Who will pay?

Meanwhile, the costs of this debacle continue to mount.

When Moepathutse filed its damages claim, the IDT responded with a special plea, claiming that the bid had been tailored to suit Moepathutse’s building and that Malaka had concluded the lease without board approval, which was required due to its value.

The IDT asked the court to pause the damages suit it applied in order to review its own decision and void the lease. When the IDT finally filed the review in March 2024, the deponent to its founding affidavit was none other than Malaka – hopelessly conflicted.

She put hardly any admissible evidence on the table and the outcome was predictably dire.

In a judgment delivered on 16 May, acting judge S J Myburgh complained repeatedly that the IDT had provided no evidence that its decisions were improper.

“The IDT has failed to show that the agreement concluded between itself and the respondent was tainted by any illegality. I thus find myself in agreement with the argument made by the respondent that this application is simply an attempt by the IDT to avoid liability in terms of the now cancelled agreement.”

The court dismissed the IDT’s application with costs and Moepathutse’s damages claim, which the IDT’s latest annual report says now stands at almost R14 million, is effectively irresistible, unless, perhaps, the IDT throws Malaka under the bus. The bills are coming. The question is, who will pay?  

The post IDT MISTRUST | Part 2: Minister Zikalala’s ‘whitewash’ that secured IDT CEO Malaka her job appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.

Documents obtained by amaBhungane suggest that former public works and infrastructure minister Sihle Zikalala and his close comrade, then-Independent Development Trust (IDT) chair advocate Kwazi Mshengu, mounted parallel efforts to shield the parastatal’s chief executive from investigations into a R45-million lease scandal.

Internal communications, board minutes and draft reports show Zikalala and Mshengu clearing the way for Tebogo Malaka’s elevation from acting to permanent chief executive last year despite mounting evidence of impropriety on her part.

Allegations include that Malaka concluded a lease agreement with politically exposed Moepathutse Property Investments behind the IDT board of trustees’ backs and beyond her delegation of authority.

The lease, for a building adjacent to a nature reserve in Irene, Centurion, was intended to provide the IDT with new headquarters, but the IDT never took occupation, leading Moepathutse to sue for R14-million in damages.

That court action was delayed pending the IDT’s own court bid to review and set aside the lease agreement. The IDT’s review, opposed by Moepathutse, was dismissed in May. The outcome of the damages claim, which the IDT is defending, is still pending.

Moepathutse is directed by former politician Thaba Mufamadi and his relative Vhonani Mufamadi – the brothers of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s national security advisor Sydney Mufamadi. Moepathutse has denied wrongdoing or that it had a relationship with Malaka.

Part one of this series shows how, soon after taking over as IDT chair, Mshengu led his board in quashing a forensic investigation facilitated by National Treasury, asking Zikalala to have his Department of Public Works and Infrastructure conduct a probe instead.

Part two will examine how Zikalala tasked the department’s internal auditors – but not to probe allegations against Malaka.

Treasury confirmed to amaBhungane that its investigations were “already at an advanced stage” when Mshengu pulled the plug, but that Mshengu declined to be apprised of findings so far.

Zikalala was minister at the time but has been deputy to the DA’s Dean Macpherson since the formation of the government of national unity last July.

Macpherson removed Mshengu from the board this year.

The IDT is a multi-billion rand implementing agency of the department, responsible for social infrastructure like schools and clinics.

Mshengu and Zikalala have denied any correlation between their actions, which they maintain were justified. Malaka, who is fighting to retain her position in the face of amaBhungane exposés, did not respond to detailed questions regarding the allegations against her.

Stop-start tender

To casual observers, it may appear as though Malaka’s troubles began when Macpherson took over as minister, when in fact they started two years ago under a previous IDT board.

The controversy is rooted in an early 2022 board resolution to sell the IDT’s existing headquarters at an unassuming office park in Pretoria East and procure leased premises instead. Malaka was already acting chief executive at this point.

The tender process was seemingly derailed in May that year when Malaka received a protected disclosure from the head of security, Wilhelm Meyer.

An IDT affidavit filed as part of subsequent litigation with Moepathutse alleges that on an impromptu visit to Moepathutse’s property, Meyer witnessed the chair of the bid specification committee arriving in the same car as someone connected to Moepathutse. This raised concern of an inappropriate relationship.

At a subsequent meeting of the bid specification committee, the chair allegedly specified criteria – a canteen, a bicycle shed, showers – that “surprisingly fit” Moepathutse’s property.

Meyer’s evidence – which was central to the review – was dismissed as hearsay because he refused to depose to an affidavit.

That was unsurprising, given that by the time of the review Meyer had been dismissed (on unrelated charges) after his disclosure had been effectively buried.

The review judge also found no backing in the available documentary evidence to support Meyer’s claim the bid specifications were tailored to suit Moepathutse.

However, Meyer’s disclosure set off a chain of events still rippling out now.

A May 2023 draft report from the board to Zikalala states that Malaka did not voluntarily bring Meyer’s disclosure to the board’s attention until it demanded answers from her. It also alleges that “an extensive investigation” Malaka promised Meyer was superficial at best. Nonetheless, the tender was cancelled and a second advert placed in August 2022.

Despite the protected disclosure, Moepathutse was recommended as the winning bidder and an unsigned lease agreement provided to the board for approval in January 2023.

Board in the dark

The board was, however, unaware that Malaka had already signed a letter of award to Moepathutse in November 2022. Moepathutse signed its acceptance on the same day. The rental amounted to R45-million over five years.

The board was also unaware that In December 2022, Malaka had proceeded to sign a lease agreement despite her then-finance chief warning it was above their delegation of authority and needed board approval.

The board knew nothing of this when it was time to give their approval.

“An unsigned lease was provided in the board meeting pack, and no reference at all was made by [Malaka] on the fact that a signed lease existed,” the draft report to Zikalala read. It also recorded Malaka’s excuse that she was “not responsible for compiling the board pack”.

The board approved the lease agreement in February 2023, in the absence of then chair Zimbini Hill and despite outstanding concerns.

The following month, however, after receiving a whistleblower report deemed “highly relevant” to the lease procurement, it rescinded its approval. It also resolved to initiate a two-part forensic investigation: into the lease procurement itself and into HR-related allegations against Malaka and other managers.

It was only after this that the board was furnished with the lease Malaka had signed months earlier without authority. It is this signed lease that Moepathutse is using to back its R14-million damages claim against the IDT.

Draft board minutes display trustees’ dissatisfaction with Malaka:

“The board is concerned at the level of dishonesty as management never disclosed the signed lease of 2 December 2022. The CFO informed the acting CEO in an email on 2 December 2022 that the signed lease was beyond the delegation of the acting CEO and the CFO… The board cannot ignore the actions of management in how the lease matter was handled.”

The draft minutes and report cite evidence that Moepathutse marketed the same building at significantly lower rates than the IDT lease. Michael Sutcliffe, an ANC-aligned veteran bureaucrat then on the board, submitted documentation allegedly showing that Moepathutse had advertised an annual rental of R4 459 932 – 43 percent less than the IDT’s first-year commitment of R7 851 178.

Moepathutse said in response to amaBhungane’s questions that its price was “the lowest of the six bids received by the IDT in response to the public tender”.

The draft report to Zikalala, which was circulated to all board members and sent to Zikalala after minor edits from the trustees, states that the board had agreed on the terms of reference for the proposed forensic investigation and that the minister was briefed in detail.

It is understood that the document submitted to Zikalala did not differ materially from the draft seen by amaBhungane.

Board ‘dysfunctional’

The board now faced a dilemma. It wanted to procure a forensic firm to conduct its probe but felt it could not trust IDT management with the process.

Initially, the board considered calling for bids from the department’s approved panel of firms, but that panel had expired. Questions also emerged about the board’s legal authority to initiate procurement.

The board then mandated the company secretary to approach National Treasury about undertaking the investigation as a neutral third party. Treasury confirmed it could do so and the company secretary kick-started the process. Treasury appointed law firm ENS to assist.

A dispute later arose over whether the board had actually mandated the company secretary to launch the investigation or merely to explore its feasibility. This would form the basis for a reconstituted board to halt Treasury’s investigation, despite records showing that both the board and minister were briefed on the investigation’s timeline and costs in September 2023.

Moepathutse lodged its high court claim based on the disputed lease contract that same month. Zikalala subsequently intervened with a “fact-finding mission”, citing governance concerns “arising out of the complaints raised with my office”.

Two sources with knowledge of events say that shortly after Treasury’s investigation commenced in October, Malaka allegedly refused to cooperate.

When investigators complained, board chair Hill wrote to Malaka urging her to co-operate. Malaka lodged a grievance against Hill in turn.

Soon after, Zikalala wrote to board members asking them to justify why they should not be removed “for failure to implement the mandate of the IDT”. Hill resigned on 8 October and was followed by two more trustees.

Defending his intervention to amaBhungane, Zikalala said: “The board members were not aligned and were clearly divided on many issues rendering the board dysfunctional. After observing this state of paralysis and that this board was nowhere near fulfilling its fiduciary duties, I wrote to all board members, not just Ms Zimbini Hill… Three board members responded while others resigned.”

Hill’s resignation paved the way for Mshengu’s entry. Zikalala appointed him as a trustee in November 2023, after which the board elected him as its chair.

A former kwaZulu-Natal ANC Youth League chair, Mshengu enjoyed Zikalala’s trust.

When Zikalala became provincial premier in 2019, he appointed Mshengu as his education MEC. They served together until their defeat in the ANC’s 2022 provincial elections, where Zikalala had stood for chair on the “Ankole” slate with Mshengu as his deputy. Mshengu had also served as a board member on Zikalala’s own charitable trust.

‘Protect the board’

At his inaugural meeting chairing the IDT board towards the end of November 2023, Mshengu set the tone. According to minutes, he shared ”observations” on Treasury’s investigation, questioning both its terms of reference and impartiality.

The board then resolved “to consider taking a decision that would protect the board”; “that the current forensic investigation should be halted”; and that Zikalala should be asked to have his department investigate Moepathutse’s appointment “specifically relating to the relationship between” Moepathutse and Malaka.

A treasury spokesperson said in response to amaBhungane questions that it had received a letter from Mshengu that December “instructing the treasury not to proceed further…

“However, by that point, the National Treasury’s investigation was already at an advanced stage. Based on the information collected, evidence obtained from imaged computers, and consultations with relevant officials, the treasury concluded its investigation.”

By that time there were already draft reports and contact had been made with the Hawks. Treasury appears not to have wanted its and ENS’s work to go to waste.

According to Treasury, “In February 2024, the National Treasury wrote to the board chairperson requesting a meeting to present the findings of the investigation as at the time of termination. The chairperson, however, declined, stating that the board would not accept any investigation reports from the National Treasury, referring to the December letter terminating the Treasury’s mandate.”

Mshengu defended his actions, telling amaBhungane that when Zikalala and then-deputy minister Bernice Swarts introduced him to the rest of the board, they “indicated that they had received complaints from Ms Malaka on how the investigation was conducted by National Treasury – which she viewed as having pre-determined outcomes. The ministry then requested the board to look into these allegations”.

The matter was considered at the next board meeting.

“The trustees who had an advantage of being seized with the matter before my arrival unanimously disavowed that they had agreed to the appointment of National Treasury and the terms of reference.

“According to the trustees, the company secretary was mandated to check if either National Treasury or [the department] can do the investigation and advise the board. The company secretary, however, proceeded to appoint treasury without reverting to the board and to have the board consider and approve the terms of reference.”

Mshengu said the decision to terminate Treasury’s mandate was informed by a “contamination of the process” and that the investigation “was never squashed but was referred” to the department.

He said his relationship with Zikalala was public knowledge and that he had declared it to the interview panel before his appointment. He had met Malaka for the first time when he became a trustee.

Either way, the end of the treasury investigation proved a lifeline for Malaka.

As we explain in part two, Zikalala would go on to whitewash the investigation entirely, endorsing Malaka for permanent chief executive on the basis that his inquiry “found no wrongdoing” against her.

It never, in fact, investigated her.

In July 2024, on the day Macpherson and other government of national unity ministers were taking the oath of office, Mshengu signed off on Malaka’s permanent appointment.

Editor’s note: Following a ruling by Deputy Press Ombud Tyrone August, amaBhungane has updated Part One of this series to reflect the outcome of a High Court ruling in Moepathutse’s favour, dated May 2025 and traversed in Part Two of this series. The Ombud ruled against most of the complaints by Moepathutse but found that amaBhungane erred by not including some details of the court ruling that favoured Moepathutse. For the full ruling, see https://presscouncil.org.za/2025/09/22/moepathutse-property-investments-and-directors-vs-amabhungane/

The post IDT MISTRUST | Part 1: How minister Zikalala and his ‘comrade chair’ Mshengu nixed probes into CEO Malaka appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.

Malaka was a regional general manager at the time and according to what amaBhungane can determine, would have overseen the company’s appointment.  

AmaBhungane obtained a list of 85 payments from the IDT to D Molefi Logistics, a company directed by Lesego Dorcas Molefi. 

Molefi is married to Lebogang Robert Molekwa and according to trust information, Molekwa and Malaka are both trustees of the Magogodi Family Trust.  

AmaBhungane has established that Malaka’s maiden name was Molekwa, while sources who spoke to amaBhungane said that Molefi is Malaka’s sister-in-law, married to Malaka’s brother.

Neither Malaka, Molefi nor Molekwa responded to texts, calls or requests for comment.

Following amaBhungane’s questions to the IDT on Friday, 4 April, a social media campaign was launched against the publication and its co-founder, Sam Sole, hurling accusations of an “orchestrated character assassination”. 

However, the IDT, like the individuals involved, did not respond to amaBhungane’s questions about Malaka’s potential conflict of interest concerning D Molefi Logistics.

Large entity 

The IDT is a Schedule 2 public entity in terms of the Public Finance Management Act (like Eskom, Transnet and Denel). 

It manages infrastructure projects on behalf of government departments when they want, for whatever reason, to outsource this role. 

For a fee paid by the client department, the IDT handles the procurement, implementation and handover of projects such as social infrastructure, which includes building and maintaining roads, schools, hospitals and police stations. 

Instead of government departments paying contractors directly, they pay this money through IDT. The IDT, therefore, handles billions in government money, and it seems that a chunk of this money found its way to a company linked to Malaka’s family. 

Family connection

D Molefi Logistics scored at least seven contracts with the IDT while Malaka was regional general manager in Gauteng. Here she also oversaw the North West and Northern Cape regions – precisely the two provinces in which D Molefi Logistics scored contracts in the same timeframe.

This means that Malaka would have overseen the awarding of the contracts which, according to our information, totalled R33 407 134.

As far as amaBhungane could establish, contracts of less than R10-million would have been handled at a regional level, where Malaka was in charge.  All contracts apart from one were below that threshold. 

Malaka – whose full name is Magogodi Elizabeth Tebogo Malaka – and Molefi’s husband Lebogang Molekwa, are co-trustees in the Magogodi Family Trust.

All indications, including Malaka’s maiden surname, suggest that Malaka and Molekwa are siblings, but neither party would confirm this. 

Following the first award, the IDT paid D Molefi at least 85 times. According to our records, while each payment lists a project code (the contract the company was paid for), it does not specify the nature of these projects.

However, payments do specify which province and department the project would fall under. Most of the projects fell under the North West region and were handled by the IDT on behalf of the Department of Education. 

Sources who spoke to amaBhungane on condition of anonymity said that some projects related to the replacement of mud schools with brick structures. However, the IDT would not confirm whether D Molefi Logistics had completed these projects. 

D Molefi Logistics has no website, and its registered office is the same as Molefi’s residential address. 

The only online presence D Molefi Logistics has is its bids for other contracts in the North West and Northern Cape, including with the Independent Election Commission (IEC), the North West Department of Education and the Northern Cape Department of Public Works and Roads.

In 2010, the company was in final deregistration due to non-compliance in filing its annual returns but was reinstated later that year. Between 2014 and 2016 – when the company scored multiple contracts with the IDT – it found itself in the process of deregistration twice. 

Beleaguered

Malaka was appointed to chair the IDT board in August 2021, paving the way for her appointment as acting CEO in October of that year.

At the time, the Auditor General told the IDT that Malaka’s appointment contravened the PFMA and the IDT’s human resources policy as there was “no formal written appointment letter and employment contractual agreement signed and agreed to for the appointment”.

Her appointment as CEO was only formalised in June 2024 according to her LinkedIn profile. 

The IDT has been dogged by controversy since early 2024, when, according to a News24 report, National Treasury initiated an investigation over allegations of “corruption, financial management and maladministration” concerning the IDT’s head office lease.

It is not clear what the outcome of that investigation was.

Then, in July 2024, News24 reported that the Hawks were investigating the director general of the National Department of Health, Dr Sandile Buthelezi, concerning allegations that he had solicited a R500 000 payment from a contractor, Base Major. 

The IDT awarded the company a multi-million-rand contract to refurbish Tambo Memorial Hospital in Gauteng through a highly questionable process on behalf of the health department, amaBhungane reported.

At the end of July, the Special Tribunal set aside contracts worth R1.6-billion that the IDT awarded to five companies to implement projects for the Department of Correctional Services between 2011 and 2012. In one case, The Tribunal found that the award was ‘predetermined’.

In late 2024, amaBhungane and Daily Maverick exposed irregularities in an R800-million oxygen plant tender, which also raised questions about Malaka’s role. As a result, Minister of Public Works Dean Macpherson initiated an investigation into the allegations.

Macpherson has kept up the pressure on the IDT, appointing audit firm PWC to investigate the oxygen contract and announcing that he would be recommending lifestyle audits on all senior staff at the IDT.

Targeted campaign

A day after amaBhungane sent questions to the IDT concerning Malaka’s family connections, a targeted social media campaign ignited on X (formerly Twitter) against amaBhungane. 

What seem to be paid influencers and bots churned out a flurry of posts about the publication “serving the interests” of faceless and nameless individuals while “spreading propaganda” as well as conducting a “smear campaign”. 

Many of the accounts that posted had also previously posted in support of the IDT following Macpherson’s shake-up of the board and revelations of the dodgy R800-million oxygen contract. 

On Wednesday, an unidentified person using the pseudonym “Agora Echo” contacted amaBhungane warning of the imminent publication of an “open letter” regarding the “disturbing findings involving your journalist, Ms Azarrah Karrim”. 

Agora Echo exists only on X and joined the platform in January this year. It has been spreading a fake AI video purporting to be the Minister of Public Works Dean Macpherson calling certain politicians “monkeys”, as well as documents purporting to be a plan to target the IDT. 

It has a group of bot and paid accounts boosting engagement. 

In a personal message from an unregistered burner number, the same entity purported to have obtained “legal clearance from the Johannesburg court” to “access your financial records, communication logs and call data”. This allegedly included “contact with the IDT and its executives”. 

AmaBhungane asked for a copy of the alleged court order, to which the unidentified person replied, “there is no need to disclose that to you am [sic] told by the team”. 

They added that “it was just a message to show you what you can expect for investigations that almost made our clients commit suicide”. They did not say who the “client” of the anonymous X account may be. 

The post IDT Mistrust: Beleaguered IDT paid R33m to company belonging to CEO Tebogo Malaka’s family member appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.

The Independent Development Trust (IDT) handled the tender process on behalf of the provincial transport department.

One company, Bulkeng, clinched a R197-million contract – the biggest of the lot.  

The IDT seems to have an affinity for Bulkeng, with the company previously scoring the majority share of a problematic R800-million tender to supply oxygen plants to health facilities across the country. 

That contract was later cancelled following an exposé by amaBhungane and Daily Maverick last year, with the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure (DPWI) appointing audit firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) to investigate allegations regarding irregularities in the oxygen plant tender.

Amabhungane understands that IDT officials dug in their heels, saying they would not cooperate with the PWC investigation until the National Department of Health (NDOH) had been informed. As a result, DPWI minister Dean Macpherson has put the IDT board on terms to ensure that they fully cooperate with PWC.

Now, the IDT is at the centre of another scandal.

A cache of internal IDT procurement documents seen by amaBhungane, including bid submissions, company documents and evaluation reports for the five different procurement processes, indicate the possibility of bid rigging.

The documents show how points awarded to certain companies were seemingly manipulated – or appeared arbitrary – and how the IDT apparently ignored key documentation. In the case of Bulkeng, amaBhungane’s investigation suggests some reference documents were forged.

Neither the IDT nor the KZN Department of Transport responded to amaBhungane’s detailed request for comment, including on why the department outsourced procurement to the IDT given that the KZN DoT routinely handles similar contracts.

The rocky road tenders

In 2022, the IDT issued tenders for the following roads to be rehabilitated:

• Road P61 in the Ugu District, awarded to Bulkeng. 
• Road P284, awarded to Nolan’s Earthworks and Plant Hire for R189 million, also in the Ugu District.
• Road D1911, awarded to Big Mac Plant and Civil for R18 million, in the Empangeni Region.
• Roads D826, D657, P528, awarded to Zack’s Business Enterprise for R16 million, in the eThekwini Municipality, Durban.
• Roads L2724, D1652, D1664, awarded to KKL IT Solutions and Projects for R14 million, in the eThekwini Municipality, Durban.

The tender processes for roads P61 and P284 ran concurrently, opening on 21 October 2022 and closing on 2 December 2022. 

The rest also ran concurrently from 22 November 2022 until 15 December 2022. 

Another Bulkeng bid

According to procurement documents, Bulkeng once again scored a lucrative contract via the IDT through a possibly irregular process. 

This is not the first time Bulkeng has courted controversy under IDT oversight. 

Last year, AmaBhungane and Daily Maverick exposed the company’s R428-million contract to supply oxygen tanks to health facilities nationwide, which was procured through a highly irregular process in 2023. 

IDT chief executive Tebogo Malaka and NDOH director general Dr Sandile Buthelezi pushed the project over the finish line despite glaring red flags.

In November 2024, director of Bulkeng Nkosinathi Ndlovu was found dead days after we questioned him about the matter, prompting an ongoing police investigation.

In December, Macpherson launched a forensic investigation into the IDT’s handling of that tender, appointing PWC in January this year to lead the probe.

Following Ndlovu’s mysterious death, his sister Thembisile Thango took over the company in February.

According to her Facebook profile, Thango works for the ANC’s Parliamentary Constituency Office in Pietermaritzburg. 

KZN ANC spokesperson Fanle Sibisi told amaBhungane that Thango is no longer employed by the ANC following the May 2024 general elections. He added that Thango had never donated money to the ANC.

Thango did not respond to amaBhungane’s request for comment.  

Vital road

According to a statement by the KZN Department of Transport last year, road P61 is a “vital” road connecting several municipal roads in uMuziwabantu Local Municipality and a “critical artery” leading into the N2, creating “a significant pathway for commerce, travel, and regional growth.”

While Bulkeng bid for both roads P61 and P284, documents seen by amaBhungane show it was disqualified from the process for P284 because IDT officials claimed the company’s Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (COIDA) certificate was invalid. 

This certificate is a mandatory requirement that confirms a company’s coverage against workplace injuries or diseases.

Having an invalid certificate would automatically disqualify any company from bidding, but amaBhungane confirmed that Bulkeng’s certificate was, in fact, valid at the time, and the company won the contract for P61 using the same certificate. 

Officials also claimed that Bulkeng failed to submit a list of subcontractors for P284 – another mandatory requirement for the tender.

This would have been an unusual oversight because Bulkeng had indeed submitted this required list in the case of the tender for road P61, which ran concurrently. 

Instead, Nolan’s Earthworks was awarded the contract for P284 as the only shortlisted bidder and the only bidder out of 13 companies to list its subcontractors – another anomaly.

While the tender evaluation report claims to be for road P61, it is actually for road P284.

Massage

Bulkeng’s successful quote for P61 also appears to have needed massaging.

Tender documents show that Bulkeng initially bid R205-million, exceeding the price threshold set by the company’s Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) grading.

Bulkeng has a CIDB grading of 8 CE, precluding contractors from working on projects valued above R200-million.    

According to the IDT’s submission to the management bid adjudication committee (MBAC), officials told Bulkeng it had miscalculated its Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) contribution, saying it had calculated it at 6% of the bill of quantities instead of 5%.

AmaBhungane has studied this information and found that Bulkeng in fact calculated the EPWP at 4.7%. Still, the IDT allowed Bulkeng to ‘correct’ this. 

But, this is not all Bulkeng did.

In ‘correcting’ its EPWP contribution, Bulkeng decreased its construction costs by over R6-million. It also lowered its CIDB build programme contribution by almost R200 000, bringing the total quote down to R197-million – just below the grade 8 threshold.

IDT officials told the MBAC “it should be noted that, no unfair advantage was afforded to the bidder since they were the only responsive bidder and adjustment did not increase the original bid amount”.

After the contract was awarded, however, costs shot up again. 

According to the KZN DoT’s 2023/2024 annual performance plan, the project cost now stands at R338 919 000, though a Select Committee on Public Infrastructure report (dated 4 December 2024) puts the total estimated cost at R238.9-million. 

Either figure exceeds Bulkeng’s 8 CE grading limit.

Forgery?

Bulkeng’s bid submission includes further red flags suggesting possible forgery in documents it supplied as proof of similar work done in the past – another mandatory requirement.

Over two days, Ndlovu is said to have collected six signatures from clients spread across the country. 

Curiously, all the references share a similar mistake: the client signatures were made where Ndlovu’s should have been, and Ndlovu signed where the client should have signed. IDT officials did not appear to question these red flags.

Further, amaBhungane contacted one of the referees, Qinisa Construction, whose director Justin Mthembu told us that “the signature [is] not mine and the contract details also not mine.” 

Ndlovu also listed another company, Torrex Mining Group, as a reference; this company, however, does not exist.

AmaBhungane contacted the director of Torrex Mining Services, Maasene Kgatle, who also confirmed that the signature on the document was not his, adding, “I never heard of this company before”.

Other companies’ scoring anomalies 

While Bulkeng lost out on the tender for road P284, Nolan’s Earthworks, based in Pietermaritzburg, secured the R189-million contract. 

Nolan’s bid exceeded the department’s initial R110-million estimate and official statements later placed the contract’s value at over R190–million.

That project was handed over on 13 February 2024 and links Port Edward and Izingolweni in southern KwaZulu Natal. 

According to the department’s social media, “the rehabilitation of P284 will impact the lives of the community as well as create mobility with uninterrupted access to schools, churches, clinics, police stations, and taxi ranks.”

Further evidence suggests that in the other four tender processes, Nolan’s, Big Mac Plant and Civil and Zack’s Business Enterprise were strategically positioned to win contracts through questionable scoring methods. 

The trio received points for “similar-scale projects,” “client references,” “key construction personnel,” “plant ownership,” “programme schedule,” and “financial viability”.

However, the points granted for each category shifted dramatically between parallel tenders, suggesting they were tailored to secure specific outcomes.

Although the tender processes for this set of contracts ran within the same timeframe, points awarded in the same categories varied depending on the tender and which company was awarded the contract. 

For instance, Nolan’s scored eight out of 20 points for “key construction personnel” in the D1911 process but 15 out of 20 for P284, helping Nolan’s receive 80 out of 100 points for P284 compared to just 38 out of 100 for D1911 – a much smaller and presumably less demanding project. 

Nolan Govender, director of Nolan’s Earthworks, told amaBhungane he was unaware of the department’s original internal price estimate but said it “will not necessarily reflect the actual cost of designing and constructing the road”. 

He referred other questions regarding the points scored to the IDT.

Zack’s Business Enterprise also benefited from erratic scoring. 

The IDT awarded the company a R16-million contract for roads D826, D657 and P528. The company does not have a website and according to Treasury’s central supplier database, operates in furniture manufacturing and security services.

In other bids, Zack’s was awarded zero out of 20 points for “plant ownership” and zero for “financial viability”, but in the tender process it won, Zack’s scored 20 out of 20 points for “plant ownership” and 5 out of 10 points for “financial viability”, somehow gaining an asphalt plant and financial stability in the same timeframe. 

Zacharia Sekgoka, director of Zack’s Business Enterprise, did not respond to amaBhungane’s request for comment except to insist that the company does own an asphalt plant. He did not divulge where.

Big Mac Plant and Civils benefitted from similarly erratic evaluations by the IDT.

In the tender process for road D1911, which it won, it scored five out of 10 for “financial viability” but zero points in the same category for L2724, D1652 and D1664 (which another company, KKL IT Solutions, won). The five extra points were enough to shift the outcome in its favour.

Director of Big Mac Marimuthu Munien said he was unaware of any manipulation in the procurement process as bidders do not have access to this information. He added that it is an internal IDT process.

Pressure

The unexplained anomalies will add to the pressure building on the IDT, especially around Bulkeng, with the minister demanding answers and accountability around the oxygen tender and there is alleged resistance from officials to cooperating with PWC. 

In a letter dated 27 March 2025, Macpherson accused the IDT of causing an “unnecessary delay” in the investigation when it demanded that the department inform the NDOH of the investigation, pending which the IDT would not cooperate with PWC. 

“Notwithstanding that no such communication was legally required for IDT to comply with its obligations to immediately and fully cooperate, DPWI sent correspondence to the DOH as requested by the IDT officials and received the DOH’s approval to proceed with the investigation.

“The IDT’s demand caused an unnecessary delay in this urgent and important investigation. The demand was and is unjustifiable and ought not to have been made,” Macpherson told the IDT. 

He further ordered the board to investigate the “lack of cooperation” from IDT officials and submit a report by 2 April to hold those officials accountable. He further ordered that the board ensure “the IDT fully cooperates with PWC and DPWI regarding the investigation,” including any requests for information.

The post IDT mistrust: bid ‘manipulation’ in R436m road tenders brings Bulkeng back into spotlight appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.

In 2023, the IDT issued a request for quotation (RFQ) for the refurbishment of Tambo Memorial Hospital in Boksburg, Johannesburg, following a gas tanker explosion in 2022, but the awarding of this project to construction firm Base Major was mired in red flags.

Chief among these were:

• according to the IDT only three bids were responsive, but they ranged from R20-million to R2.5-billion, making the comparison meaningless;
• the shortlisting of a company with links to notorious corruption-accused tenderpreneur Edwin Sodi; and
• the winning contractor Base Major’s approved bid of R566 million was more than double the R270-million initially budgeted by the Department of Health.

This was the same contract at the centre of graft allegations against Buthelezi, who is the subject of a Hawks investigation into claims that he solicited a R500 000 bribe from Base Major in July 2023. That docket has been with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) for the past seven months.

Late last year, amid these concerns, the department paid Base Major over R21 million in initial payments through the IDT, which handled the procurement and contract management on behalf of the National Department of Health (NDOH).

The IDT is a government infrastructure implementing agent under the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure handling procurement, project management, construction work and handover for government departments for a fee.

According to his spokesperson James de Villiers, Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure Dean McPherson expressed concern over governance at the IDT following the entity’s failure to submit its 2023/24 financial statements.

These new revelations will add to concerns regarding the IDT, including those flowing from another health department tender for oxygen plants that was previously reported on by amaBhungane and Daily Maverick.

Siphoning the money?

News24 previously reported that the Hawks are investigating allegations that Buthelezi leveraged his network in the NDOH and the IDT to solicit the R500 000 bribe from a consultant working for Base Major in July 2023.

Buthelezi allegedly provided the banking details of a company based in Durban to colleagues in the department, along with the instruction to direct the Base Major consultant to transfer the money into that account.

When the money was transferred it was allegedly funneled through another company before either an alleged associate of Buthelezi or a proxy collected the money in cash and delivered it.

The claim is that Buthelezi, in return, allegedly interfered in the procurement process for the renovation of Tambo Memorial Hospital and ensured Base Major won the contract. 

By then the contract had ballooned in price due to the late inclusion of solar and fire compliancy in the renovations, as well as new assessments undertaken during the bidding process.

Denials

IDT CEO Tebogo Malaka signed the appointment letter for Base Major despite the obvious discrepancies and red flags.

IDT spokesperson Phasha Makgolane said Malaka was not aware of the bribery allegations against Buthelezi at the time and was “never put under any sort of pressure to sign the appointment letter for the said contractor.”

While the Hawks did not wish to comment on the status of their investigation, NPA spokesperson Lumka Mahanjana said numerous meetings have been held with the investigating officer and the whistleblower.

“There are no delays in respect of the investigation, there is regular interaction between the prosecutor and the investigating officer.  Dr Buthelezi has not been engaged,” Mahanjana added.

Department of Health spokesperson Foster Mohale referred most questions to the IDT but said that “the Department will cooperate with the law enforcement agencies, as and when approached to enable them to execute their mandate.”

“The Department urges anyone with evidence of bribery or unethical behaviour by officials to present it the law enforcement agencies to investigate accordingly,” Mohale added.

Buthelezi did not offer any comment independently of the department’s statement.

Base Major also referred most of amaBhungane’s questions to the IDT but denied that it had ever paid a bribe to secure the contract, saying there had been no communication with either Malaka or Buthelezi before the awarding of the contract.

“Base Major does not pay bribes in order to secure work, or for any other reason. Base Major was awarded the Tender based on the content of its bid, which was superior to that of any other bidder.”

It added that no one in the company had been contacted by the Hawks to provide information on their investigation.

President’s eye

The matter has caught the attention of President Cyril Ramaphosa, who is looking into the bribe allegations against Buthelezi, according to spokesperson Vincent Magwenya.

In a terse response to amaBhungane’s questions on whether Ramaphosa has met with officials to discuss the allegations against the DG and whether he plans to suspend Buthelezi, Mangwenya said that “the matter that you reference is being looked into. That’s all I can say for now”.

According to the Public Service Act (PSA), only the President has the authority to appoint or remove a director general or the head of a national department, leaving Buthelezi’s fate squarely in Ramaphosa’s hands.

A procurement mess

Tender documents show how Base Major scored the contract despite red flags in the procurement process.

According to the submission to the IDT’s executive bid adjudication committee (EBAC), three companies were shortlisted for the project.

However, on closer inspection of the price quoted by each company – Base Major, Qinisa Construction and G5 Group – two of them should have already been disqualified by this point.

Base Major quoted R566 981 646, while Qinisa Construction quoted an astronomically high R2 548 211 718. G5 Group – a company with links to ANC benefactor Edwin Sodi – was recorded as having quoted R19 129 437, although this was not in fact the case.

The R19 million quote belonged to Zafricon Construction, not G5 Group, yet somehow, G5’s name was linked to the bid.

Angelique Moodley – who labelled herself as G5’s director but in fact resigned in 2021 – left the offer letter blank yet signed off on it.

Zafricon Construction quoted R19 129 439 – R2 more than what G5 Group was said to have quoted.

Interestingly, IDT spokesperson Phasha Makgolane claimed that G5 Group was eliminated from the process after failing to complete the form of offer letter.

However, documents clearly show that G5 Group pulled out of the process entirely at the last stage. Once that happened, the obvious choice based on price would have been Base Major.

“The amount submitted by G5 Group was not captured as the ‘Form of Offer’ was NOT completed as required, which meant they were outright eliminated,” Makgolane said.

“As indicated before the contractor that pulled out was Zafricon Construction and NOT G5 Group. They [Zafricon] have acknowledged the error in the bid, and given the magnitude of the error, they believed that they could not successfully complete the contract as required.”

Collins Mothabela, director of Zafricon, told amaBhungane that his company mistakenly quoted R19 million for the job based on an incorrect assessment of the works, adding that he was unaware that G5 Group had quoted the same.

Moodley said she could not answer questions around G5 Group’s bid because she is not involved in the tender office of the company. She undertook to confirm whether it was her signature on the offer letter but never did, nor did she respond to amaBhungane’s request for comment.

Moodley eventually asked amaBhungane to “stop messaging me,” adding “I don’t work for G5”.

G5 Group – formerly known as NJR Projects – has been linked to Sodi.

While he is no longer a director, he has been repeatedly linked to the company through failed tenders and financial scandals.

The Commission of Inquiry into State Capture found that Sodi had made payments referencing high-ranking ANC politicians, including Deputy President Paul Mashatile, former minister Thulas Nxesi and former Minister of Health Zweli Mkhize. The latter claimed that this was during his tenure as treasurer general and that Sodi’s payment was made into an ANC account.

Attempts to contact G5 Group were unsuccessful, as were calls and emails to contact details linked to Sodi and his company, Blackhead Consulting.

Bizarre R2.5-billion bid

Adding to the red flags, Qinisa Construction’s bid of R2.5 billion – nearly five times higher than Base Major’s – was somehow deemed acceptable for shortlisting.

Director of Qinisa Mbuso Mthembu told amaBhungane that his company based their assessment on a “total redesign” of the hospital and not just its renovation. However, this would have failed to comply with the specified scope of the project.

Despite this, Makgolane said the company had met all mandatory requirements and that their bid “covered fully conditional assessment of the hospital with quite high rates”.

Makgolane added,“the project is implemented as a turnkey development, which required potential bidders to conduct a full condition assessment of the hospital, from the basic scope of work provided. Some bidders did detailed assessments while others did not do so as required by the bid, hence the project budget variance of the bidders”.

Ballooning cost

On the ballooning of the contract, Makgolane said the original price of R270 million was a “rough estimate” with no technical scope assessment.

“Consequently, the scope was only fully evaluated and costed during the bidding process. The approved amount of R566 million, though higher than the initial estimate, is deemed reasonable based on the detailed information provided by the contractor and subsequently approved by both the IDT and NDoH.”

That statement appears to be contradicted by a budget confirmation letter dated 27 February 2023 and addressed to the DG of Health, which noted that “the IDT has concluded the Infrastructure Programme Implementation Plan (IPIP) and covers the proposed project execution, deliverables, detailed cost estimates and programme of implementation”.

Later, the IDT was asked to include solar panels, batteries and fire compliance “to all projects,” which supposedly added R150-million to the original R270-million assessment.

Payments still going ahead

Meanwhile, Base Major has been paid around R21-million since its appointment.

According to payment information obtained by amaBhungane:

• The NDOH transferred R13 000 000 to the IDT on 17 September 2024.
• The next day, on 18 September, the IDT paid Base Major R12 276 588, seemingly for work completed.
• Then, on 17 October 2024, the NDOH again transferred R9 644 909 to the same project account with the IDT.
• That same day, the IDT paid Base Major that full amount.

These payments, totalling R21 921 497, include bills for a performance bond, insurance and site establishment. Makgolane told amaBhungane that the payments to Base Major were done as per contractual agreement.

The post IDT contractor embroiled in Health DG bribe allegations won highly suspect tender, new evidence shows appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.

The NDoH has since written to the IDT to withdraw from the project, according to a statement issued by the IDT’s board of trustees. The board has directed the IDT’s management to accept the NDoH’s instruction. According to the statement, the IDT’s management maintained that “procurement processes were followed”.

The project, bankrolled by the Global Fund, one of the world’s largest health financiers, was initially set to cost R216-million, but the figure later ballooned to R836-million. The main contractor, Bulkeng, failed to adhere to several of the project’s original requisites yet somehow managed to secure a R428-million portion of the roll-out.

In this latest instalment in Daily Maverick and amaBhungane’s joint investigation we unpack seemingly irregular tender processes associated with the project. The IDT, a government infrastructure implementing agency, appointed Bulkeng to install pressure swing adsorption (PSA) oxygen plants at 45 government hospitals.

A joint venture (JV) between Maziya General Trading and On Site Gas Systems International clinched a R152-million contract to install plants at a further ten hospitals.

Our investigation shows that the IDT seemingly expanded the project’s scope after it took over as the NDoH’s implementing agent. By altering the quantities and the sizes of the required plants at many of the hospitals, the IDT paved the way for far costlier contracts.

An implementation plan for the project, adopted by the NDoH and the IDT in August 2022, set the budget at R216-million. This boils down to an average spend of roughly R3.61-million per hospital. The following year, however, the IDT altered the bill of quantities and the contractors were eventually appointed at an average cost of R10.5-million per site. The IDT and the NDoH have been at pains to explain how the project’s budget ballooned by nearly 300%.

We’ve established that Dr. Sandile Buthelezi, the health department’s beleaguered director-general, and the IDT’s CEO, Tebogo Malaka, played key roles in getting the contentious contracts over the finish line, despite concerns about the cost overruns.

Buthelezi reportedly already faces an investigation for allegedly soliciting a R500 000 bribe from an unrelated contractor in another IDT project. He was also suspended in 2021 over his role in the Digital Vibes scandal but later returned to work after an internal disciplinary hearing cleared him of wrongdoing.

We can also reveal that the IDT, ostensibly with Buthelezi’s consent, ran afoul of the 2022 implementation plan by omitting or circumventing key requirements, including those related to the bidders’ South African Health Products Regulatory Authority (SAPHRA) registration status and their gradings from the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB).

We will also detail how the IDT apparently allowed Bulkeng to slip key documents into its bid bundle more than a year after the tender had closed.

Finally, we will highlight some of the statements the IDT and the NDoH made in relation to the project, illustrating how the IDT in particular has apparently been disseminating patently false or misleading claims.

We sent the IDT and the NDoH detailed queries regarding each matter unpacked in this piece. Both organisations vowed to respond but failed to do so before our deadline.

Instead, the IDT’s board of trustees on Monday afternoon issued its statement. The board said it “noted with serious concern” the allegations regarding the project.

“…anything that smells of malfeasance should be nipped in the bud and those found to be responsible of such, shall face consequences management”, the board’s chairperson, Adv. Kwazi Mshengu, was quoted as saying.

Vital bid requirement dropped

Documents in our possession, including Bulkeng’s company records and the IDT’s request for quotations (RFQ), point to a flawed procurement process, one that allegedly saw Bulkeng appointed at an inflated cost despite the fact that it wasn’t qualified for the project.

The procurement process, a two-pronged affair, was concluded in 2023.

First, the IDT advertised a tender to appoint contractors to a panel of would-be suppliers. More than sixty entities submitted bids, and in June last year the IDT appointed eight companies to the panel.

Next, in July 2023, the IDT issued RFQs to the panel members and eventually picked Bulkeng and the Maziya/On Site Gas JV for the roll-out.

Much of the controversy around Bulkeng’s appointment stems from its SAHPRA certification – or rather lack thereof.

In our previous reports, we detailed that Bulkeng had never been registered with SAHPRA, and that it had submitted another entity’s certificate to the IDT.

The IDT has since repeatedly claimed that a SAHPRA certificate was never a mandatory requirement for bidders, but we can now illustrate why this statement is disingenuous.

An infrastructure programme implementation plan, or IPIP, signed in August 2022 by various NDoH and IDT officials, forms the basis for the oxygen plants project.

The IPIP document very clearly states that SAHPRA certification needed to be factored into the IDT’s procurement process.

When the IDT issued its tender and RFQs, the SAHPRA requirement was somehow omitted, which would have opened the door to unqualified companies like Bulkeng.

Construction Industry Development Board

The 2022 implementation plan also called on the IDT to manage the procurement process in line with the CIDB’s requirements.

Unlike the SAHPRA specification, the CIDB requirement did make it into the IDT’s tender, although the threshold was quite low.

Companies with a mechanical engineering (ME) grading of five and higher were allowed to submit bids.

A grading of five limits companies to a project value of R10-million or less. Considering the project’s initial budget of R216-million, the grading requirement seems to have been far too generous.

Bulkeng has an ME grading of eight, so it easily cleared this minor hurdle. However, the company’s grading still only qualifies it to work on projects with a maximum value of R200-million.

It is therefore unclear how the IDT managed to appoint the company for a R428-million contract.

The IDT’s uneven application of the CIDB requirement raises another red flag.

According to a submission by the IDT’s Management Bid Adjudication Committee (MBAC) dated October 2023, at least one of Bulkeng’s rival bidders was disqualified from the bid because the contract value would have exceeded its CIDB limit. It is unclear why the IDT did not apply the same standard to Bulkeng.

Enter the DG and the CEO

In July 2023, Bulkeng, the Maziya/On Site Gas JV and three other companies submitted their quotations to the IDT. The bids were staggeringly high, with the lowest among the lot coming in at more than double the R216-million budget.

The Maziya/On Site Gas JV’s quote came to R862.6-million, while Bulkeng said it would do the job for an eye-watering R1.18-billion.

Word soon spread among NDoH and IDT officials that the project’s budget would be raised to accommodate the sky-high bids.

Naturally, the development sparked concern over the potential legal and auditing implications. The project already had a set budget. Any attempt to pour additional funds into the roll-out risked triggering an irregular expenditure finding.

The matter came to a head in early August 2023, at a meeting held by the project’s steering committee, a seven-person body that consisted of officials from the NDoH and the IDT, plus an external auditor.

The committee, in a formal resolution, decided that it would be best to restart the procurement process, citing the escalating budget and the SAHPRA requirement’s omission from the RFQ as the main reason for doing so. They also referenced the CIDB issue.

The committee sent a letter to the IDT’s CEO, Malaka, requesting that the process be restarted.

But Malaka never responded to the committee. Instead, it seems she chose to directly consult with Buthelezi, the health department’s DG. We know this because later that month, Buthelezi allegedly told the committee that he’d spoken to the IDT’s CEO. He allegedly told the committee’s members that he was happy for the IDT to continue with the bid process.

By all appearances, Malaka and Buthelezi had effectively brushed aside the committee’s concerns.

Their apparent disregard for the cost considerations is seemingly manifested in a “concurrence approval”, signed by both officials in October 2023. The document sought to raise the program’s budget to R987.4-million, a jaw-dropping R771-million more than the IPIP budget from the previous year.

According to our sources, this was a bridge too far for the Global Fund, which apparently instructed the IDT and the NDoH to formulate a more realistic figure.

A second “concurrence approval”, signed by Buthelezi in February 2024, introduced a budget of R580-million. Malaka’s signature also appears on this document, but it is not clear when she signed it.

The R580-million figure is exactly enough to cover the contracts awarded to the two winning bidders, but this was not the final project budget. The IDT and the NDoH have both confirmed that the budget had been set at R836-million. This means they had somehow released an additional R256-million. It is not clear when this figure was adopted by the two state bodies and whether it had been cleared by the Global Fund. It is also not clear which contractors, if any, were going to benefit from the additional spend, although the NDoH previously indicated that the R836-million budget included “professional fees, management fees and maintenance costs” for the oxygen plants.

The appointment of Bulkeng and the Maziya/On Site Gas JV, meanwhile, was finally concluded in June 2024. Malaka signed the letters of intent that reflect the “final allocation” of the two bidders’ respective sites.

After the fact 

The Bulkeng contract that Malaka and Buthelezi green-lighted seems dubious for yet another reason.

The RFQ called on bidders to submit letters of support from whichever Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) they’d chosen to work with. Where relevant, the bidders also had to furnish the IDT with signed JV agreements.

Our assessment of Bulkeng’s bid documents strongly points to a flawed and possibly unlawful bid process. All indications are that Bulkeng failed to comply with key mandatory requirements and that the IDT nevertheless allowed the company to clinch the lion’s share of the project’s roll-out.

As far as we could establish, Bulkeng’s original bid submission did not include a letter from its chosen OEM, nor one from Brutes Air Solutions, the company we previously identified as Bulkeng’s partner in the bid.

What we did discover, however, is a letter from Brutes Air’s CEO, Christo Bruwer, addressed to the IDT. According to the heading, the letter serves as “Official Confirmation of Collaborative Partnership with Bulkeng for PSA Oxygen Plants”. But the letter is dated 25 July 2024, so we have strong reason to suspect that the IDT entertained this crucial document a full year after the RFQ had closed.

Bruwer claimed there had been “a few versions” of the letter, including one that had been submitted in time for the 2023 RFQ. We asked him for a copy of the earlier version, but he said he couldn’t share it with us without the IDT and Bulkeng’s consent. Bruwer wouldn’t say why it had been necessary for him to draft a 2024 version.

Bulkeng’s letter from its OEM, or lack thereof, should also raise eyebrows.

The company’s bid included a letter that explained its relationship with Brutes Air and its OEM, Atlas Copco, dated 17 July 2023.

However, Atlas Copco only submitted a letter to the IDT on 10 October 2024, more than a year after the RFQ had closed.

What’s more, the letter doesn’t do much for Bulkeng’s cause as a bidder. It merely states that Brutes Air is an “authorised partner” of Atlas Copco. Bulkeng therefore failed to submit a letter that affirmed its own agreement with an OEM.

Under normal circumstances, Bulkeng’s failure to adhere to these bid requirements should have disqualified the company from the process.

Soaring costs 

The IDT has made several dubious claims regarding the oxygen project’s ballooning costs.

Following our first reports on the issue, the organisation went as far as claiming that the original R216-million budget was for fifteen hospitals, not sixty.

The IDT’s spokesperson, Phasha Makgalane, claimed in a live interview with Newzroom Africa that the R216-million budget was compiled as far back as 2017.

Elsewhere, the IDT has claimed that the budget was formulated in 2019 and therefore had to be adjusted to account for inflation. It has also claimed that the lower figure excluded VAT and maintenance costs, claims the NDoH has also repeated.

None of this is true.

The August 2022 IPIP clearly shows that the R216-million figure was less than a year old when the RFQ went out. What’s more, the budget covered the roll-out of oxygen plants at sixty hospitals, including VAT, installation costs and maintenance.

We compared the IPIP to the bill of quantities the IDT later issued with the RFQ. This exercise explained why the costs had risen so dramatically.

The Tshepong Hospital in North West, for instance, required only one small (10Nm³/h or 15Nm³/h) PSA plant at a cost of roughly R2.84-million, according to the 2022 IPIP. However, the IDT altered the bill of quantities so that bidders were required to submit quotes for two large (40Nm³/h) plants. This meant the eventual costs would be far higher.

The IDT appointed the Maziya/On Site Gas JV to install the plants at this hospital, which the JV would have done at a cost of R24.4-million – a hefty 757% increase from the original IPIP budget.

Bulkeng, meanwhile, was appointed to install a large plant at the St. Andrews Hospital in KwaZulu-Natal. It would have done so at a cost of R13.9-million. The 2022 budget, meanwhile, called for a small plant at a cost of only R2.84-million. A large plant, according to the IPIP, should in any case only have incurred a cost of roughly R8.5-million – still far less than what Bulkeng would have gotten.

At the Jubilee District Hospital in Gauteng, where one large plant would have sufficed, Bulkeng was set to install two large plants at a cost of nearly R28-million, a far cry from the R8.5-million budget envisioned in the implementation plan.

We looked at all 45 sites assigned to Bulkeng. Nearly every hospital that required only a small plant, as per the 2022 IPIP, was upgraded to a medium or a large one. The sites awarded to the Maziya/On Site Gas JV were given the same treatment.

Maziya’s CEO, Chris Delport, strongly denied that his company was trying to fleece the IDT through excessive pricing.

He emphasised that the bidders had no say in the drafting of the bill of quantities, and that Maziya and its JV partner merely submitted their quotes in accordance with the RFQ.

Delport said there were several factors that contributed to the quoted fees, including the cost of installing and maintaining the plants. He said his company had factored in a mark-up of no more than fifteen percent.

“Some of the sites are in rural, far-flung places, so it costs more to go out there and install the plants. And none of these machines are manufactured in South Africa, remember, so there are import costs to consider too,” explained Delport.

We showed the project’s figures to an industry expert who told us that the numbers for the IDT project were “pure madness”.

This person, who has been involved in several PSA installations across the continent, reckoned that the roll-out could be done at a total cost of around R350-million.

The post Health DG, IDT CEO paved way for dodgy R836m oxygen plant contracts appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.

On Wednesday, Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi made the announcement during his oral reply to questions posed in the National Assembly. He was answering a question by DA member Michéle Clarke. TimesLive and Newzroom Afrika first reported on the announcement.

Last month, Daily Maverick broke the news of “ghost company” Bulkeng being awarded the lion’s share of the contract to install oxygen plants at 55 hospitals across South Africa. A subsequent joint Daily Maverick and amaBhungane investigation found evidence of potential tender fraud in the documents Bulkeng submitted for the contract. 

“When this story broke, it disturbed all of us, including [President Cyril Ramaphosa], who wrote me a letter to present to him a report within 14 days,” Motsoaledi told the National Assembly. 

According to Motsoaledi, the project is funded by the Global Fund, a Geneva-based powerhouse coalition of governments and civil society organisations dedicated to fighting Aids, tuberculosis and malaria. It is “the world’s largest multilateral funder of global health grants in low- and middle-income countries”, according to its website.

“When the story broke, I was in Brazil and the Global Fund was there,” said Motsoaledi. 

“We met and they promised that they too would send their own inspectors to investigate this matter.”

The Global Fund donates R10-billion every three years to South Africa, added Motsoaledi. During Covid-19, it set its target on acquiring oxygen plants for South African hospitals when it heard that facilities had run out of oxygen. 

“That’s why they decided that part of the money must now be used to put oxygen plants in 55 hospitals so that, in future, the hospitals will no longer issue tenders for oxygen, and they will be self-sufficient,” said Motsoaledi. 

He explained that his department delegated procurement to the Independent Development Trust (IDT), a government infrastructure implementing agency reporting to the Department of Infrastructure Development under Minister Dean Macpherson.

“For this issue, because we are just a client department, it is [Macpherson] who is busy investigating this issue, but I talk to him every day about it, including today, to get to the bottom of this,” said Motsoaledi. 

“I can assure you that it is being investigated by Minister Macpherson, because IDT accounts to him. I am working with him, and the Global Fund is independently going to investigate this matter because this is their money. Then they will be able to bring out the findings.”

Daily Maverick revealed last month that the contract to install the highly technical pressure swing adsorption (PSA) oxygen-generating plants ballooned from R256-million to R836-million. 

Bulkeng managed to clinch the lion’s share of the contract — about R400-million — despite the company having no online presence, no certification from the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority (Sahpra) and a very elusive director, Nkosinathi Ndlovu. 

A subsequent joint investigation by amaBhungane and Daily Maverick found more damning evidence that Bulkeng had seemingly used a Sahpra certificate belonging to a third-party company without that company’s knowledge, and a witness signature used in its offer letter to the IDT may have been forged. 

Read more: Alleged tender fraud, shock ‘death’ of contractor cloud R836m hospital oxygen plants project

Bulkeng also seemingly used a business address in Sandton to tender for the contract when it no longer occupied those offices. 

Days after Daily Maverick and amaBhungane finally met with Ndlovu, he was purported, via X (formerly Twitter), to have died; however, attempts to verify this at police stations, mortuaries and via the police were unsuccessful.

The post Global Fund deploys inspectors to probe R800m health contract after ‘ghost contractor’ exposé appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.

A joint Daily Maverick and amaBhungane investigation has identified discrepancies in the regulatory certificate used by Bulkeng, the little-known company that somehow won the lion’s share of the project’s spend. The company also seemingly used an address it didn’t occupy when it submitted its bid, while an allegedly fraudulent witness signature found its way onto one of its bid documents.  

The Bulkeng saga took a bizarre twist last week, when an IOL journalist claimed on social media that the company’s sole director, Nathi Ndlovu, was “allegedly found dead”. The post came only three days after Daily Maverick and amaBhungane met with Ndlovu and his lawyers in Johannesburg. We have not yet been able to confirm any details regarding Ndlovu’s purported demise. 

One of Ndlovu’s lawyers said they had been in contact with their client’s family. He couldn’t confirm whether the businessman had indeed passed away. Asked if his firm would respond to the issues raised in this article, the attorney said they no longer held a brief for Ndlovu. 

Our focus, for the time being, remains on the tender process that preceded this dramatic turn of events. 

Hawks spokesperson, Colonel Katlego Mogale, has confirmed that the matter is under investigation but added, “the team is not revealing too much information so as not to jeopardise the case”.

Daily Maverick previously reported that the Independent Development Trust (IDT), acting as an implementing agent for the Department of Health (DoH), appointed Bulkeng and other private contractors to install oxygen plants at fifty-five hospitals across South Africa. The project’s budget, initially set at roughly R250-million, has ballooned to R836-million.

Bulkeng, seemingly a “ghost company” with no online presence, no offices and a very elusive director, secured the largest portion of the oxygen plants roll-out. 

We have examined Bulkeng’s bid submission and supporting documents and have found several red flags, one of which stems from the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority (SAHPRA) certificate Bulkeng included in its application.  

“Improper” use of SAHPRA licence 

Bulkeng is not registered with SAHPRA and seemingly used the certificate of another company without its knowledge.  

The IDT has claimed that Bulkeng was in a joint venture partnership with an entity named “Brutas Atlas Copco Industrials South Africa”. This entity supposedly held the SAHPRA certificate Bulkeng would have needed for its bid. 

No such company, however, has ever been registered in South Africa. We’ve since established that the IDT had somehow melded together the names of two separate companies.  

The facts surrounding the SAHPRA license appear to be as follows:

Ndlovu knew full well that his company, Bulkeng, did not have the required license or certificate. He therefore approached one Christo Bruwer, the owner of a local company named Brutes Air Solutions.

Come July 2023, Ndlovu and Bruwer must have had some sort of deal in place, given that they attended a tender briefing session together on the seventh of that month. This briefing took place at the IDT’s offices in Pretoria, where Ndlovu and Bruwer were joined by one of Bruwer’s colleagues from Brutes Air, according to a signed attendance register. 

Like Bulkeng, Brutes Air Solutions was not registered with SAHPRA, so it couldn’t lawfully distribute medical equipment.  

This is where the local subsidiary of Atlas Copco, a multinational engineering and manufacturing group, enters the picture.  

Brutes Air Solutions is a distributor for Atlas Copco in South Africa, and the latter does have a valid SAHPRA certificate held in the name of Atlas Copco Industrial South Africa. This was the very certificate Bulkeng had included in its bid. 

The problem, however, is that Atlas Copco never gave anyone permission to use their license. 

“Atlas Copco was not a party to the tender process and does not know what documents the tendering parties were requested to provide. We are looking into whether there was any improper use of our license by any party in this instance,” stated Marilyn Govender, vice president for the Atlas Copco Group in sub-Saharan Africa.  

We later asked Govender whether their investigation had yielded any answers. We wanted to know whether Atlas Copco would take action against Ndlovu or Bruwer should they find that the Atlas license had indeed been misappropriated.   

“We decline to comment on this matter for the time being,” responded Govender. 

We also asked Bruwer what role he played in sourcing Atlas Copco’s SAHPRA certificate.

“Only after our quote was accepted was there a request from [the] IDT through Bulkeng on if the equipment/product was Sahpra certified, which it is, and we confirmed same as the distributor of Atlas Copco,” Bruwer wrote in an email.  

But what of Govender’s assertion that Atlas Copco wasn’t aware that anyone had used their license? Wouldn’t this potentially amount to tender fraud? 

“We cannot comment on your averments as to what Atlas Copco told you but again we confirm that we are a distributor of Atlas Copco and we are in constant discussions with Atlas Copco on all matters as their distributor and they have full knowledge on what we do, and what you read between the lines are denied and unsupported,” stated Bruwer.  

Contrary to what the IDT has stated, Bruwer denies that Brutes Air Solutions was in a formal joint venture with Bulkeng.  

“We confirm that Bulkeng is a customer and only a customer [and] like any other customer of Brutes we were requested to quote on the project for Bulkeng, which we did, and which was accepted and approved. We are not and never were in a JV with Bulkeng,” Bruwer told us. 

The attendance register for last year’s tender briefing, however, points to a much closer relationship between Bulkeng and Brutes Air. Bruwer and his colleague, one “A. Koekemoer”, both signed the document as supposed representatives of Bulkeng. They didn’t write their own company’s email address in the relevant box either, instead opting to include one for Bulkeng. 

Asked about the briefing session, Bruwer stated: “We attended the meeting as the technical support on our accepted quote for Bulkeng and all parties were and are fully aware who we are and the roll that we play. We were there for various technical presentations and everything was done with and under Brutes’ logo and we were and always are clothed with Brutes’ brandings.” 

Bruwer said he did not know anything about Ndlovu’s purported death. “We have seen news of the unfortunate passing of Mr. Ndlovu, but we have no details relating thereto,” he noted. 

The IDT and the health department both failed to respond to our detailed queries. 

“The IDT and Health will be issuing a media statement regarding the PSA in due course,” said IDT spokesperson Phasha Makgolane.  

When no such statement was forthcoming, we followed up with Foster Mohale, spokesperson for the DoH.  

“We haven’t made a decision on whether to proceed with statement or another approaches [sic]”, Mohale said in a text message.  

Addressing concerns 

Further red flags stem from the business address Bulkeng referenced in its bid documents and in other records related to the tender.  

The documents include an offer letter to the IDT for the oxygen roll-out. This document lists Bulkeng’s address as a commercial building on Rivonia Boulevard in Johannesburg. 

 We visited the address and found a block named Edenburg Terraces that is now largely occupied by a private school. 

On Bulkeng’s tender documents, Ndlovu claimed that his company had been located in “Block A”. In the signed offer letter, Ndlovu stated that Bulkeng had occupied unit “A2-005”. while other Bulkeng tender documents reference unit “C2-003”.  

These unit numbers were, by all accounts, a thumb suck. “One thing I can say for certain, Edenburg Terraces never had offices with the unit numbers he is claiming,” the property owner said. 

In fact, the owner said that Bulkeng had never leased offices at Edenburg Terraces.  

However, it seems likely that Ndlovu did at one point work from the building. The facilities manager recognised Ndlovu’s name and suggested that he may have been subletting from another tenant.  

In any event, Ndlovu had almost certainly vacated the building by the time he signed the tender documents.  

The Sparks School, which now occupies the entirety of Block A, opened its doors to primary school learners in January 2022. The high school opened in January 2023. Bulkeng’s offer letter, meanwhile, was signed in July 2023.  

We sought clarity from Ndlovu regarding Bulkeng’s business premises when we met him at  his attorneys’ offices. He refused to confirm where Bulkeng’s current offices were located, instead undertaking to “respond in writing”. 

“Not my signature” 

The signed offer letter yielded another red flag.  

The document was supposedly witnessed by one Audrey Reddy. We managed to track down a businessperson who goes by that name. As it so happens, Audrey Reddy is a supplier of office equipment to the IDT.  

We showed her Bulkeng’s offer letter. “Fraud”, was her response. She confirmed that the witness signature did not belong to her.  

We pressed Ndlovu for details surrounding the signature. Could he perhaps recall who exactly Audrey Reddy was? Could he tell us where he was when she witnessed his company’s offer letter, and could he provide us with her contact details? 

Ndlovu refused to answer our questions, again vowing that he would respond in writing. 

“Allegedly dead” 

Three days after our meeting with Ndlovu and his lawyers, IOL journalist Thabo Makwakwa claimed in a post on X (formerly Twitter) that Ndlovu had died.  

The post has since gained significant traction, but we haven’t managed to confirm Ndlovu’s death, albeit hardly for lack of trying.  

We visited several police stations and mortuaries in Gauteng and contacted some of his family members and business associates, all in vain. 

We also asked the police whether they knew anything. 

At the time of writing, SAPS spokesperson  Lieutenant-Colonel Mavela Masondo could not confirm whether Ndlovu had indeed died.

Meanwhile, sources familiar with the oxygen plants initiative said they weren’t sure how the project would proceed. 

As things stand, Bulkeng’s involvement in the roll-out seems to be up in the air. 

The post Alleged tender fraud, shock ‘death’ of contractor cloud R836m oxygen plants project  appeared first on AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.