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		<title>The R280m Joburg ‘crime scene’: How CoJ kept Kgoro in business (part three)</title>
		<link>https://amabhungane.org/211111-the-r280m-joburg-crime-scene-how-coj-kept-kgoro-in-business/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Susan Comrie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Nov 2021 03:30:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Stories]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amaB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amaBhungane]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ANC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cedar Park Properties 39]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chancellor House]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[City of Joburg]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[erf 575]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eric Wood]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Herman Mashaba]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Keabetsoe Holdings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kgoro central]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kgoro consortium]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Niven Pillay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nthatisi Modingoane]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regiments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[State Capture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tshepo Mahloele]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Capital]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zwelibanzi “Miles” Nzama]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amabhungane.org/?post_type=stories&#038;p=15339</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In part three of the series, we look at how the city, under the ANC’s leadership, rolled over and allowed a politically-connected consortium to hijack three hectares of prime city land.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amabhungane.org/211111-the-r280m-joburg-crime-scene-how-coj-kept-kgoro-in-business/">The R280m Joburg ‘crime scene’: How CoJ kept Kgoro in business (part three)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amabhungane.org">AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In his final months as mayor in 2019, Herman Mashaba discovered a new political punching bag: erf 575, the three hectares of land above the Sandton Gautrain station.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What annoyed Mashaba was not what was there, but what was missing: in 2008, the city had decided to sell the land to a politically-connected consortium to build a multi-billion rand development, linking the Sandton Gautrain to Nelson Mandela Square and the heart of Sandton.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But 10 years had passed without any sign of construction. Worse, the city had transferred the land to the Regiments Kgoro consortium without being paid the R280-million purchase price.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“This is not only absurd but highly suspect,” Mashaba fumed in one of his free-wheeling press releases.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mashaba announced he was launching a full forensic investigation, but a month later, said the city had been advised that there was no way out of the deal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“[T]he R280-million purchase price was &#8230; payable once the development of the land was complete. However, the development never got off the ground and the city has never been paid a cent. As such, the city essentially gifted the land to [the consortium],” he fumed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What Mashaba did not know was that while the city sat empty-handed, a few connected people&nbsp;—&nbsp;including former mayor Parks Tau’s brother-in-law and a mysterious trust with connections to the ANC&nbsp;—&nbsp;had already made millions from the deal.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you missed it, catch up on Part two of amaBhungane’s investigation, <a href="https://amabhungane.org/stories/211110-the-r280m-joburg-crime-scene-part-2/"><em>The R280m Joburg ‘crime scene’: Strategic friends.</em></a></p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is tempting to connect the dots and speculate that the presence of a connected elite explains why the disastrous deal stayed on life support. But the city insists its decision to keep the deal alive was purely commercial.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Contradicting that claim, amaBhungane’s investigation shows that the city had ample opportunity to cancel what was already a bad deal, as the consortium repeatedly missed payment deadlines and reneged on promises made during the bid.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The city could have walked away. Instead, it chose to hand over what has been described as the “most important piece of undeveloped real estate in South Africa” and hope that it would one day be paid&nbsp;—&nbsp;and that day still seems a long way off.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Where’s our money?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 2008 sale of erf 575 came with strings attached: the land will be transferred back the city free of charge in 50 years&#8217; time. But the R280-million purchase price was still low, and unlike most property deals, the purchase price would not be paid on transfer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“In order to enhance the introduction of previously disadvantaged developers into the construction sector, the payment of the purchase price is structured on a vendor-financed basis,” Regiments, the majority shareholder, would later write.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vendor financing is when a company gives a customer a loan to buy the company’s products. In this case, the city was giving the consortium a valuable piece of land, which it would leverage to raise funds, including the purchase price. The R280-million owed to the city would be secured through a mortgage bond but would rank second to mortgages registered by other lenders.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This was the part that Mashaba had found “absurd”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Even leaving Mashaba’s gripe aside, the Regiments Kgoro consortium failed to make good on key promises it had made during the bid.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During the evaluation of the bids the consortium had received full marks for its willingness to pay&nbsp;—&nbsp;upfront&nbsp;—&nbsp;a facilitation fee to the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A rival bidder, the Sandton Spirit consortium, had proposed paying the fee in several tranches, which the bid evaluation committee found less appealing.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Was the evaluation of the bids tainted by Regiments’ promise to bankroll a mining venture linked to one of the members of the bid evaluation committee? Read part one of amaBhungane’s investigation, <em><a href="https://amabhungane.org/stories/211109-joburgs-r280-million-crime-scene/">The R280m Joburg ‘crime scene’</a>.</em></p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But when it came time for the Regiments Kgoro consortium to deliver the promised R58-million fee, those assurances evaporated into thin air.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The facilitation fee was supposed to be paid in July 2009, when the agreement was signed. In August, JPC issued a letter of demand for the first R35-million. Instead, the Regiments Kgoro consortium negotiated a one-year postponement.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But by June 2010, the consortium still did not have the money.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What we can see from internal emails is that Regiments approached various potential funders&nbsp;—&nbsp;including the Development Bank of South Africa and the Industrial Development Corporation&nbsp;—&nbsp;looking for R100-million in pre-development finance or other forms of investment, but none of them were interested.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One of the issues was that the Regiments Kgoro shareholders were not willing to provide any funding to the project, yet they had taken up all the shares, leaving no room for a bank or developer to take an equity stake in the project and share in the R1.8-billion in profit that was anticipated to flow to the shareholders.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By November 2010, the JPC told the consortium to take possession of erf 575 and pay what it owed. To show it was serious, JPC boss Helen Botes asked the city to withhold Regiments’ fees on other contracts until the full R58-million facilitation fee plus interest was paid.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The threat was enough to spook the consortium’s own shareholders.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mxolisi Mbetse, a veteran of the public and private sectors who held an 8% stake in the consortium, wrote to Regiments voicing his “concerns” about “an increasingly uphill battle” to find someone to fund the project.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“[R]aising of the finance has now become a priority, and frankly urgent, given that we will soon start giving JPC and the City the undesirable impression that we are not in a position to develop this property, possibly resulting in it being re-tendered,” Mbetse wrote in one email.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The consortium’s lawyers were equally worried: JPC sounded like it was laying the groundwork to declare a breach and cancel the deal, they warned.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Strategic friends</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When Botes froze its fees, Regiments tried to negotiate a new deal with her boss, the city’s head of economic development Jason Ngobeni. When Botes refused to back down, Regiments turned to Geoff Makhubo for help.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In late 2010, Makhubo was the treasurer of the ANC’s Greater Johannesburg region. He also had a long-standing, compromising relationship with Regiments: in 2005, he had helped Regiments to secure the lucrative sinking fund contract from the city, and had received a 10% cut ever since.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It was these funds that Botes had now frozen.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“[T]he withholding of these funds is unlawful and needs to be released forthwith,” Regiments wrote in a “cheat sheet”, saved as “Geoff Makhubo briefing.docx” and described in internal Regiments emails as “the one pager that we gave to Geoff”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Makhubo, who passed away earlier this year, previously denied that he had received these instructions or acted on them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But by the end of 2010, the city had agreed to unfreeze most of the funds, and had offered the consortium generous new payments terms: the consortium would no longer be required to pay the R58-million facilitation fee upfront. Instead, Kgoro would start paying R5-million a month from May 2011, until the debt and added interest was paid.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Never-ending goodwill </strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Even today, after more than a decade has been wasted and the city is still defending the deal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“We were bullish in terms of the negotiation and pressure we put on Regiments &#8230; but we had to keep our eye on the bigger development,” Botes told us in a recent written response.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“Like most of the development deals concluded by JPC, negotiations around this deal &#8230; would require a lot of haggling between the parties and a lot push back between the parties to negotiate and renegotiate until the development is concluded.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This, she said, was “consistent” with how JPC deals with any developers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“Our main goal is to ensure that development of the site happens&#8230; [W]e will not cancel a deal because of the delays in the payment of the facilitation fee,” she told us.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The city echoed these sentiments: “We thought it best to take that approach to amicably resolve the payment issue,” spokesperson Nthatisi Modingoane told us via email.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But the consortium’s 2008 promise, to pay R58-million as soon as the deal was signed, had been a key reason why it had won the bid.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A consultant who had been asked to review the bids in 2008 had concluded that the Regiments Kgoro consortium&#8217;s offer “brings significantly more certainty to the City (for both the [purchase price] and the facilitation fee to JPC)” and that “given the City&#8217;s liquidity and funding constraints”, this presented the best offer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But by 2011, the city had three years’ experience with the recalcitrant consortium, and knew that there was a widening gap between what was promised and what was delivered.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In May 2011, the consortium&nbsp;—&nbsp;as per the new agreement&nbsp;—&nbsp;had started making payments of R5-million a month towards the outstanding facilitation fee.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But in October 2011, Regiments informed JPC that it was reducing the payments to R1-million a month.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Privately, the consortium’s lawyers warned that the decision to reduce the monthly payments constituted a breach and JPC could cancel the entire Kgoro deal at any moment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">JPC protested but never cancelled the deal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>We&#8217;re a non-profit newsroom that exposes wrongdoing, empowering people to hold power to account. But we cannot do it without </em><em><u><a href="https://amabhungane.org/support/">your support</a></u></em><em>.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The game of chicken</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By 2012, the consortium’s payments to JPC had slowed to a trickle. With interest, the facilitation fee had grown to more than R90-million, and only half had been paid.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Reluctantly, JPC accepted the R1-million a month on the promise that the outstanding balance would be paid when erf 575 was transferred to the consortium.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But in a June 2012 meeting, Regiments director Niven Pillay made it clear that this would not happen: “[T]he consortium is made up of BEE players and &#8230; it was always understood that we would borrow money against the land&#8230; [T]he reality is, if we have to pay the facilitation fee in full on transfer, we will not be able to get Phase 1 of the development out of the ground,” he told JPC officials, according to minutes of the meeting.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is worth taking a step back here: the Regiments Kgoro consortium had promised the city that it would have no problem paying JPC’s R58-million facilitation fee as soon as the deal was signed. That was in 2008 and the consortium had, in part, won the tender based on that promise.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After four years and many promises this was the new reality: the consortium could only pay JPC’s facilitation fee if it used erf 57&nbsp;—&nbsp;“arguably the most important single piece of undeveloped real estate in South Africa”—&nbsp;as collateral.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The last concession</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By 2013, Regiments had finally found a funder.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vantage Capital, a Johannesburg-based lender, had agreed to loan R150-million to the consortium. Although the terms of the Vantage loan were considered “nasty”, it would finally give the Regiments Kgoro consortium the pre-development finance it needed to kickstart the development of erf 575.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vantage would only grant the loan once erf 575 had been transferred to the consortium. But the money would not be used to pay for the land.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Instead, almost R50-million would go to Regiments to repay loans it extended to the consortium at a whopping 30% interest rate. The rest would be spent on marketing, legal fees and kitting out the street-level shops surrounding the Sandton Gautrain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The consortium would continue drip-feeding JPC R1-million a month, but this meant it would take another three years to pay the facilitation fee in full.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Meanwhile, the agreement the city signed in 2009 meant that it would only be paid the R280-million purchase price once the sectional title scheme was registered.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The purchase price would attract interest of 10% per year, but, crucially, interest only started being charged from the date of transfer, which had now been delayed by four years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to JPC’s legal advisor, the delay in transferring the property was costing the city R2.5-million a month in lost interest. If 10% had been charged from day one the purchase payment would have risen to R450-million by 2013, meaning the city had already lost roughly R170-million on the deal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Today the city is eager to blame itself as much as the consortium: “There were many delays in the transaction. Those delays could not be placed squarely at the door of the [consortium] &#8230; Both parties committed acts, which delayed the transactions,” Botes told us.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But the city should have walked away. The deal was a bad one and by now there was ample evidence that the Regiments Kgoro consortium could not be relied on to meet its financial commitments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Instead, the city agreed to give the consortium yet another chance: on 13 June 2013, erf 575 was officially transferred to Cedar Park Properties 39, the consortium’s special purpose vehicle.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It had taken four years just to transfer the land.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What the city did not realise is that this is as far as the development would go. For the next eight years, erf 575 would stand empty, waiting for construction equipment that would never come.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The downfall</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The story of Regiments’ fall is a familiar one by now.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By 2015, Regiments had become one of the most successful financial services firms in the public sector, thanks largely to consulting contracts alongside McKinsey. But the contracts required Regiments to pay up to 60% of its income to front companies controlled by the Guptas.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This financial squeeze led to a falling out between the partners; Gupta acolyte Eric Wood left Regiments and took the lucrative consulting contracts with him. Without the Guptas’ Midas touch, the firm’s fortunes faltered. Then, as the extent of State Capture was exposed, Regiments was faced with a series of law suits. In the process, its servers were seized and assets frozen.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As the authorities closed in, so too did Vantage Capital.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2018, Vantage applied to the courts to put Cedar Park Properties 39 into liquidation over its failure to repay the R150-million loan granted to the consortium that, with interest, had grown to more than R300-million.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a last-minute bid to keep its deal alive, Regiments presented a R1.25-billion offer from property developer Michael Georgiou. But the offer arrived after the deadline and the liquidation was granted.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>To make sure you can easily and instantly f</em><em>ollow this investigation and others like it </em><em><a href="https://amabhungane.org/newsletter-sign-up/">sign-up to receive our free newsletter</a> </em><em>.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The city’s choices</strong><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Currently, Cedar Parks is still in liquidation. The liquidator appointed to dispose of Cedar Parks’ only asset&nbsp;—&nbsp;erf 575 and its development rights&nbsp;—&nbsp;has publicly estimated it is worth R1.5-billion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If erf 575 is sold, the land can finally be developed and the city should finally get paid the purchase price&nbsp;—&nbsp;with interest currently more than R600-million. But the liquidation could take years, leaving erf 575 trapped in limbo.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The city remains bullish: “Our main goal is to ensure that development of the site happens,” Modingoane told us, adding: “All commercial developments takes more than 10 years to get off the ground.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We asked the city about the fate of the forensic investigation instituted under Mashaba, but it failed to provide any response.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Recently, it was reported that the city filed a claim against Regiments, in a bid to claw back fees from the firm’s management of the sinking fund&nbsp;—&nbsp;demonstrating, perhaps, that Regiments’ reign in the city is over.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But Regiments spent years cultivating officials in the city and in the ANC. When it comes to the City of Johannesburg, Regiments literally has the receipts.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-embed is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper">
<iframe title="The R280m Joburg ‘crime scene’: Slideshow" width="500" height="281" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/zDw3tvJdhzo?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe>
</div></figure>
<p>The post <a href="https://amabhungane.org/211111-the-r280m-joburg-crime-scene-how-coj-kept-kgoro-in-business/">The R280m Joburg ‘crime scene’: How CoJ kept Kgoro in business (part three)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amabhungane.org">AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">15339</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The R280m Joburg ‘crime scene’: Strategic friends (part two)</title>
		<link>https://amabhungane.org/211110-the-r280m-joburg-crime-scene-part-2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Susan Comrie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Nov 2021 03:18:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Stories]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amaB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amaBhungane]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ANC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blessing Rugara]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capitec]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chancellor House]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[City of Joburg]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gautrain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jason Ngobeni]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Keabetsoe Holdings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kgoro consortium]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Litha Nyhonyha]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mamatho Netsianda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mphathi Nyewe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nthatisi Modingoane]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parks Tau]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regiments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sipho Twala]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Susan Comrie]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLD Mining]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tshepo Mahloele]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vox]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[West Street]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[William Mathamela]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zukile Nomvete]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zwelibanzi “Miles” Nzama]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amabhungane.org/?post_type=stories&#038;p=15320</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This is part two of a three-part series that looks at the sale of erf 575 – three hectares of prime land above the Sandton Gautrain – to a consortium with deep connections to the ANC.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amabhungane.org/211110-the-r280m-joburg-crime-scene-part-2/">The R280m Joburg ‘crime scene’: Strategic friends (part two)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amabhungane.org">AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During the 2019 elections, president Cyril Ramaphosa promised the residents of Alexandra that the ANC-led government would build a million houses, including many for the settlement’s overcrowded township.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What few people knew was that the residents of Alexandra were supposed to have a stake in a multi-billion rand property development on the other side of the M3 highway in Sandton.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2008, the city had awarded erf 575&nbsp;—&nbsp;three hectares of prime land above the Sandton Gautrain station – to the well-connected Regiments Kgoro consortium.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Read part one of the Kgoro development series:</em></p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://amabhungane.org/stories/211109-joburgs-r280-million-crime-scene/"><em>Joburg&#8217;s R280-million &#8216;crime scene&#8217;&nbsp;</em></a></p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In its bid, Regiments had promised that a 5% stake would be given to an “Alexandra Local Community Trust” along with a share of the R1.8-billion in profit that was anticipated to flow from the development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That promise was never fulfilled. But neither were the numerous other promises that the consortium made to the city. Instead of scrapping the deal and developing a new plan, the city kept indulging a tiny and influential elite.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In part two of amaBhungane’s investigation we explore who got rich off the “highly suspect” deal that saw “arguably the most important single piece of undeveloped real estate in South Africa” being hijacked from the city.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The brother-in-law, the spook, and the mysterious ANC-linked trust</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During the bidding for erf 575, the Regiments Kgoro consortium sold itself as a broad-based black economic empowerment structure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But it took two amaBhungane access to information demands – one in 2012 and one in 2020&nbsp;—&nbsp;to reveal a list of shareholders, although the full list of names of those with an interest in the deal is still not known.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Regiments Capital, the company that became infamous for facilitating state capture, held the biggest chunk: 76.5%.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another 8% was held by Vermogen Real Estate, a subsidiary of the Industrial Development Group (IDG), run by Mxolisi Mbetse and Bajabulile Swazi Tshabalala.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mbetse, who died in March, had a track record in both government and business, but it was his partner, Tshabalala, who was more intertwined with Regiments, as our <a href="https://amabhungane.org/stories/how-state-capture-inc-funded-the-anc/">previous investigation</a> into an Ekurhuleni land deal showed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tshabalala, who is now the vice president of the African Development Bank and a director of MTN, has repeatedly refused to discuss her dealings with Regiments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another 5% was held by the professional team (architects and quantity surveyors) and 2.5% went to a women’s group: Loato Properties.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Which left 8% for three “strategic partners” and a mysterious trust:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">2% would go to Sipho Twala, a businessman and the brother-in-law of Parks Tau, the city’s then MMC for finance and economic development, and future mayor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Twala previously denied having any business dealings with Regiments. This time he said he could only discuss our questions “after the elections”, adding that he had questions of his own. Attempts to contact him after the elections drew a blank.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tau, who is now Gauteng’s MEC of economic development, told us he was unaware that his brother-in-law would benefit from the Kgoro deal at the time. “Mr Twala is a businessperson in his own right, and I would not be privy of his business interests unless such are brought to my attention,” he told us in a written response.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He became aware of Twala’s involvement, he told us, “only at the point of his exit”, which as we shall see was in 2014.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">3% would go to Sizoma ITS, run by Thabo Kubu, a former senior intelligence service official, who once ran the ANC’s internal vetting process for members of parliament. Kubu told us he was unaware of his status as a “strategic partner”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">0.5% would go to the Morwa Mmaseboga Trust, controlled by advocate Fana Nalane. Nalane said he received shares in lieu of payments for&nbsp;future legal work he would do for the consortium. He said he did not know why he had been designated a “strategic partner”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The final 2.5% would go to the Transvaal Urban Machinery Investment Trust, an opaque trust controlled by Twala.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Although the Transvaal Urban Machinery Investment Trust was seemingly never formally registered, its name is steeped in ANC history. Established in the 1970’s, the Transvaal Urban Machinery was an Umkhonto we Sizwe division that carried out operations in apartheid South Africa.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The beneficiaries of the trust’s 2.5% stake in Kgoro remain a mystery.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The consortium agreement, signed the day before bids closed in September 2008, locked its BEE shareholders in until 1 January 2014.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The wait would be worth it, Regiments promised: after the land and development costs were deducted, the net profit was anticipated to be R1.8-billion. That meant a modest 2.5% stake, like the one held by the Transvaal Urban Machinery Investment Trust, could one day deliver millions.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Silent trusts</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Although Regiments owned 76.5% of the Kgoro deal on paper, it had promised in its 2008 bid that 17.5% would be owned by various benevolent trusts:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">10% by the Education, Research and Policy Studies Trust</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">5% by the Youth Trust</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">5% by the Alexandra Local Community Trust</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Records show that the trusts were only registered three years later, in 2011. The directors of Regiments became the trustees of the first two trusts&nbsp;—&nbsp;the education and youth trusts – and were given “absolute discretion” to select beneficiaries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The records for the third trust, that was intended to benefit the people of Alexandra, are incomplete. But Mphathi Nyewe, an attorney who was treated as a de facto trustee, told us that the trust never got off the ground.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A share register provided by Regiments’ attorney confirms this: despite Regiments’ claim that Kgoro’s shareholders included numerous broad-based empowerment trusts, no shares were ever transferred to these entities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But does the official share register provide a full picture of the Kgoro deal?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Emails from the Regiments server&nbsp;—&nbsp;made public in part through leaks and seizures – suggest that while the trusts may have been left behind, Regiments was busy devising options for how an influential group of elites might be cut in.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Size 7 shoes</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Back in October 2009, Regiments had emailed consortium members asking them to provide their shoe sizes so that safety boots could be bought for an upcoming site visit to inspect erf 575.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two email addresses jump out on that list: <a href="mailto:nzama@chh.co.za">nzama@chh.co.za</a> and <a href="mailto:mamatho@chh.co.za">mamatho@chh.co.za</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The “chh” domain belongs to Chancellor House, the notorious ANC funding vehicle, and the email addresses to Mamatho Netsianda (its founder and managing director) and Zwelibanzi “Miles” Nzama (a senior executive).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Netsianda did not respond to the email, but Nzama appears to have requested a size 7 safety boot.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nzama was a valuable asset to Regiments: “He is assisting with access in certain public sector opportunities,” Regiments’ chair Litha Nyhonyha told the company, according to minutes of a May 2010 meeting.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the time, Regiments and Nzama, representing Chancellor House, were exploring a deal to buy a portion of Redefine Property’s government-tenanted buildings. The plan was to secure “soft” commitments from government that the leases would be renewed as soon as the Regiments-Chancellor House consortium bought the properties.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“Regiments to front the transaction until government commitment required,” minutes of the planning meeting read.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This suggested government officials were expected to act in the interests of Regiments and Chancellor House and not necessarily in the best interests of the fiscus.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We put such an implication to Nzama, but he declined to offer any specific response, but said: “I have every right to participate in any economic opportunity in [South Africa]. I am a private person and had never been a public official &#8230; so this attempt to create an impression that my involvement in business amounts to corruption is unfortunate, discriminatory and insulting.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This was not the first time Regiments had partnered with Nzama either: in 2007, Nzama put together a R300-million BEE deal with Capitec. Regiments was offered a generous R54-million stake, funded by the IDC. But when the share register was finalised, Nzama had disappeared from the deal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Emails from the Regiments server, however, indicate that Nzama was hiding behind a nominee shareholder or proxy, meaning that although his name appeared nowhere in the share register, he secretly held a stake worth at least R25-million.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The Marvelous Mr. Nzama</strong></h4>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2012, <a href="https://amabhungane.org/stories/anc-stands-to-benefit-from-r1bn-capitec-bank-bonanza/">amaBhungane raised questions</a> about Nzama’s role in the Capitec deal. At the time, business tycoon Tshepo Mahloele provided us with a share register showing that Nzama had never been a shareholder in Keabetsoe Holdings, the special purpose vehicle that held a third of the Capitec BEE deal, including Mahloele’s own stake.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But emails that have emerged from the Regiments server indicate that Nzama’s stake was held by Blessing Rugara, a lawyer and apparent proxy for the Chancellor House executive in Keabetsoe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nzama would not discuss this, but emails he sent to Regiments confirm the arrangement: in 2009, Regiments agreed to pay R1.35-million to buy a portion of Nzama’s shares in Keabetsoe. By 2011, the shares had still not been transferred but Nzama assured Regiments: “Blessing and I met with the lawyer working on the unbundling of my shares in Keabetsoe.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rugara did not respond to our emails, while Mahloele, who now owns one of the largest media groups in the country (which includes the <em>Sunday Times, Business Day </em>and <em>Financial Mail</em>), told us via email, “I was not privy to arrangements between Mr Nzama and Regiments and the proxy arrangements in relation to the shares.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The statutory records of Keabetsoe did not indicate he was a beneficial shareholder.” Shortly after we sent questions in 2012 about the shareholding, Rugara transferred half of his shares to Nzama, making him a 23% shareholder of Keabetsoe with a stake that, in 2012, was worth roughly R73.6-million.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So, when Nzama cropped up at the erf 575 site visit, we wondered: was Nzama hiding inside Kgoro as well?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Strategic friends?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nzama has flatly denied this, but there was some circumstantial evidence to make the question worth asking.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In January 2010, a spreadsheet was put together identifying various shareholders of the “Regiments Ladies Group” which was intended to own 2.5% of Regiments’ 76.5% in Kgoro.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The spreadsheet — “Regiment Women Group.xlsx” — was pretty straight-forward: names, ID numbers, addresses, gender, race. But it also contained a second tab with a list of seven “strategic investors” including Nzama, Twala, Tau and&nbsp;Geoff Makhubo, then treasurer of the ANC’s greater Johannesburg region and another future mayor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These names had appeared together before: Nzama had cut both Tau and Makhubo’s wives into the 2007 Capitec deal; in 2008, Regiments had asked Nzama, Twala, Tau and Makhubo to be “strategic partners” in a R205-million deal with Vox Telecom.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Regiments parlance, “strategic partners” are generally people who bring political connectivity to a deal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the Vox deal, Regiments had described the strategic partners as part of “a network of friends and business associates” and “accomplished &#8230; leaders in &#8230; business; politics and government”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the time Tau had been offered a R1-million stake in the Vox deal, he was the city’s MMC for finance and economic development, giving him political oversight of Regiments’ lucrative sinking fund contract, JPC and the ongoing sale of erf 575.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tau withdrew from the R205-million Vox deal in August 2008, just before it was signed. But his participation went far enough that the IDC had already approved the transaction with Tau’s name on the list of beneficiaries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“[T]he time from which I initially considered participation and the ultimate decision was a matter of weeks. At the time of considering participation, I had taken into account that Vox &#8230; did not do business with the city. I however still elected not to participate after due consideration,” Tau told us.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He added that as MMC his duties included oversight of the entities in the department, and not the adjudication of tenders.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is possible the list of seven “strategic investors” was an error, a hangover from the&nbsp; Vox deal.&nbsp; However, while the list in the Kgoro spreadsheet contained some of the names from the Vox deal, it also had some new ones, suggesting that the list of strategic investors was compiled for the Kgoro deal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Zukile Nomvete, a “strategic partner” in both the Vox deal and “Regiment Women Group.xlsx” &nbsp;spreadsheet, confirmed that there was a proposal for him to be given a stake in the Kgoro consortium, but that ultimately the shares were never transferred.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The other strategic investors we spoke to denied knowing anything about a plan to cut them into Kgoro.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“If someone at Regiments saw me as a ‘strategic investor’ with a view of approaching me to participate, unfortunately that never occurred as the share register which you apparently inspected confirmed that am not a Kgoro shareholder,” Nzama told us over WhatsApp. Instead, he said he had been interested in buying into the development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tau provided us with a <u><a href="https://amabhungane.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/211110-AmaBhungane-Part-2-Response-from-Parks-Tau.pdf">detailed statement</a>&nbsp;</u>but in summary told us: “I am not and have not been an investor in the Kgoro consortium.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>A city-wide conflict of interest</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One thing is clear: Regiments wanted political cover and subsequently found other ways to secure influence in the city.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By 2011, as the Kgoro deal headed into turmoil (something we will explore in part 3) the city found itself deeply conflicted when it came to Regiments and the Kgoro consortium.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After the May 2011 local government elections, Tau had been promoted to city mayor and Makhubo stepped into his shoes as finance MMC.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Makhubo had a long-standing relationship with Regiments: in 2005, he had helped Regiments to secure the lucrative sinking fund contract from the city, and had received a 10% cut ever since.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Aside from the millions paid to Makhubo’s consulting company, Regiments also made regular donations to Johannesburg branch of the ANC: R250 000 for an elective conference in July 2008, another R250 000 for the realignment of branches in August 2010, R166 750 for t-shirts and R488 206 for posters for the May 2011 elections.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the MMC for economic development, Jason Ngobeni, resigned from the city in August 2011, his department asked Regiments to pay for the farewell party. Regiments agreed to donate R100 000 towards the event.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">[sidebarContentSingleImage target=modal url=https://amabhungane.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Farewell-party.jpg] Email sent by Ngobeni&#8217;s department asking Regiments to pay for his farewell party&nbsp;[/sidebarContentSingleImage]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The city declined to comment on this aspect of the investigation: “We have not been granted access to the interviews you may have conducted with the parties you refer to nor of the other ‘evidence’ you refer to and which you have based your conclusions on. We are therefore unable to comment,” city spokesperson Nthatisi Modingoane told us.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But he added: “As a principle the City of Johannesburg does not condone the use of influence (including political influence).”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Cashing out</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In June 2013, the city transferred ownership of erf 575 to the Regiments Kgoro consortium. The agreement the city had signed meant that it would not be paid the R280-million purchase price on transfer, but only when the sectional title schemes were registered.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>*We look at the city&#8217;s sale agreement further in Part three, coming soon.</em></p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While the city would be forced to wait for its money, the consortium’s shareholders could start cashing out and cashing in.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On 1 January 2014, the lock-in period for the BEE shareholders ended. The first to bail was Twala and the Transvaal Urban Machinery Investment Trust.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On 8 October 2014, Regiments paid Twala R3.47-million&nbsp;—&nbsp;a 50% down payment for his 1.96% stake – and R1.53-million for 50% the trust’s 1.83%. From what we have been told Twala was paid more because he had loaned money to the consortium.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Together the amounts added up to a neat R5-million. Both amounts were deposited into Twala’s bank account.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Regiments would pay another R5-million to Twala and the trust six months later: R3.47-million into Twala’s account and R1.53-million into a new Standard Bank account established for the trust.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In January 2015, Tshabalala sold IDG’s stake to Regiments for R9-million. In October, Kubu sold Sizoma ITS’ stake to Regiments for R3.4-million.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While this was substantially less than the millions promised in Regiments’ early projections, it was still money for jam.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The master stroke</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By the end of 2015, Regiments owned more than 90% of the Kgoro deal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It was a masterful: Regiments had persuaded the city to hand over erf 575 by promising, amongst other things, that a broad-based black-owned consortium would benefit from its development. But once the property was transferred into the consortium’s name, most shareholders had cashed out.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Regiments would now use that same asset&nbsp;—&nbsp;still not paid for – to raise funding for the development that would, in theory, deliver more than a billion rand in profit for what was left of the consortium.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But none of this would have been possible without the city’s eagerness to keep the deal alive, despite growing evidence that the Regiments Kgoro consortium would not stick to their end of the bargain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong><em>Don’t miss part&nbsp;three of the R280m Joburg ‘crime scene’: <a href="https://amabhungane.org/stories/211111-the-r280m-joburg-crime-scene-how-coj-kept-kgoro-in-business/">How CoJ kept Kgoro in business</a>.</em></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>*This article was updated after publication to correctly identify Adv. Fana Nalane&#8217;s role in the consortium.</i></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amabhungane.org/211110-the-r280m-joburg-crime-scene-part-2/">The R280m Joburg ‘crime scene’: Strategic friends (part two)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amabhungane.org">AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism</a>.</p>
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