

Good day, Mr Harinarain,

We trust that you are doing well. The amaBhungane Center for Investigative Journalism is working on an article that involves your company, Mzansi Securifire.

The article has several focus areas. One is on how Mzansi worked with alleged organised crime boss Ralph Stanfield, his wife, Nicole Johnson, and businesses associated with their family's enterprise.

The work that Mzansi and at least one of its employees did for the family ultimately helped the Stanfield-Johnson enterprise to capture contracts flowing from a multibillion-rand government infrastructure development project in Cape Town. That project was Prasa's reconstruction of the vandalised Central Line.

Our understanding from the evidence that we have gathered is that Mzansi dealt with various companies and people associated with the Stanfield-Johnson enterprise through the involvement of Prasa's acting head of security, Alexio Papadopulo.

Evidence shows that on at least one occasion, Papadopulo instructed one of your company's executives to work with a known associate of the Stanfield-Johnson enterprise. Our evidence also shows that a former executive in your company apparently grew suspicious about some of the associated Stanfield-Johnson enterprise companies that Mzansi had to work with.

Our evidence further shows that despite these suspicions, Mzansi still ended up working with the family enterprise's associated businesses. The dealings and interactions occurred from around late 2022, when Prasa awarded your company the security and ad hoc contracts, until at least the middle of 2023.

The work between Mzansi and the Stanfield-Johnson enterprise occurred despite the couple's notoriety, which has been well documented in the media for more than a decade. They became infamous after their first arrest in 2014 in the well-known guns-for-gangs case. In this case, they were charged under the Organised Crime Act and stood accused of operating a criminal gang. Their subsequent arrests for serious and violent crimes in 2019, 2022, and again in 2023 have also been extensively documented in the media. They are currently in prison awaiting trial.

Given all the security vetting resources at your disposal, and your company's experience in the security sector, it should have been known exactly who Stanfield and Johnson were when Mzansi began dealing with them and using the services of their various associated businesses.

Your company should have blown the whistle, alerting Prasa to the risks that it faced from working with companies linked to the Stanfield-Johnson enterprise. Instead, it seemingly chose not to and continued to do work with them on the project, enabling them to allegedly commit several crimes, including fraud.

Your company was also in a position to expose the role of Papadopulo and/or members of his team in allegedly colluding with/enabling the Stanfield organisation, yet again it chose not to.

Please explain why your company took no action, or, if it did, what action was taken.

Please, in explanation, also elaborate on whether you were subject to any intimidation and its nature and source.

We emphasise that while our conclusions are based on the evidence before us, amaBhungane remains open to being convinced otherwise. This being so, please provide evidence to support any denials on your part and to give context where relevant.

Please comment on the general allegations above, and provide us with a response to each specific allegation below.

Allegations:

- 1) Evidence indicates that between November 2022 and around mid-2023, Mzansi worked with at least one company affiliated with the Stanfield-Johnson business enterprise. Mzansi's use of an associated Stanfield-Johnson business began just days after Papadopulo issued an instruction that the Central Line's three main contractors, Transnet, Diphatse Trading and Projects, and Mpande Business Enterprise, were to meet with your company's representatives at Prasa's Salt River depot in Cape Town on November 3, 2022. This meeting was to discuss ways of addressing certain security situations that had developed on the railway. Our evidence shows that it was around November 10, 2022, that Mzansi began working with a company called Yibaninati Pty Ltd. Our evidence shows that Yibaninati sent quotes to Mzansi during this period for various services. Our evidence also shows that Yibaninati facilitated the hiring of local SMMEs to work on contracts that Prasa had awarded to Mzansi. Some of these SMMEs were sourced to work on ad hoc contracts awarded to Mzansi. The ad hoc contracts included cleaning, service road maintenance, and vegetation and rubble removal. One of the companies involved in cleaning, and vegetation, and rubble removal was a Limpopo-based company, Maanda-Nes Investments. Our evidence also shows that Stanfield was kept informed of the work that was being done on Mzansi's ad hoc contracts with his associates, including his brother, Kyle Stanfield, drawing up reports of where clean-up teams had done their work, and what clean-up work still had to be done. Our evidence also shows that Stanfield was to issue instructions regarding any changes that needed to be made to reports on clean-up work that was done on the Central Line. Please comment.
- 2) Evidence indicates that one of the ad hoc contracts that Prasa awarded to Mzansi related to service road maintenance and rehabilitation work. This work was done in conjunction with Transnet's Rail Network Construction. Evidence indicates that a company called Glomix House Brokers, whose sole director is Johnson, worked with Yibaninati to source local companies to work on this ad hoc contract that had been awarded to Mzansi. The local company that worked on the service roads maintenance contract was RJM Civils. RJM Civils is owned by Randal Mullins, who, until earlier last year, was a co-accused of Stanfield in a criminal trial. Through Yibaninati and Glomix,

RJM Civils carried out the service road maintenance work between late 2022 and early 2023. Our evidence also shows that Glomix hired construction equipment to carry out maintenance work on the service roads. Please comment.

- 3) Our evidence also indicates that, as well as being involved in Mzansi's Central Line ad hoc contracts, Stanfield was also involved in the company's Central Line security contract. This involvement was apparently through Johnson's company Glomix House Brokers. The evidence shows that one of the SMMs that the Stanfield-Johnson enterprise sourced to work on the security contract is a company called PPE Security and Projects. Until his latest arrest in September 2023, PPE provided bodyguarding services to Stanfield. During his arrest at his home, Stanfield was charged with being in the illegal possession of firearms belonging to PPE. Our evidence shows that in July 2023, Stanfield had information on when and where guards were being deployed to the Central Line train stations. In at least one case, a PPE employee provided Stanfield with information on the number of Mzansi guards that had been deployed, which stations they were deployed to, and which stations PPE and Mzansi guards were working at together. Additional evidence shows that Stanfield also had information about the deployment of security stability units to deal with heightened security threats. Further evidence also indicates that Stanfield, on at least one occasion, issued instructions relating to the deployment of security guards, which should have been the responsibility of Mzansi, given that Stanfield was never officially involved in any way in the contract. Please comment.
- 4) Evidence indicates that in November 2022, a meeting was held between a Prasa official, Ephraim Samaai, and your Cape Town branch manager, Riyaaz Van Rooyen. The meeting took place at Langa train station. It was to discuss work that Mzansi was doing at the different Central Line train station clusters, specifically clusters one, two, and three. The evidence shows that Stanfield knew where and when this meeting was taking place, and who would be in attendance. Our evidence indicates that from 2022, Van Rooyen worked hand-in-glove with the Stanfield-Johnson family enterprise and their associates. During this time, he was made a director of a security company called Subtiguard Protection Services. The company was registered in November 2022 by Johnson's brother, Mogamat Saddiqe Petersen. The registration took place in the same month that Mzansi was contracted by Prasa to provide its services for the reconstruction and protection of the Central Line. Company and Intellectual Property Commission records show that Johnson is still associated with this company through her business, Glomix House Brokers. A communication from Petersen to Manuel in February 2024 confirms that Van Rooyen was involved in the company. Other evidence showing Van Rooyen's involvement with Stanfield can be found in communications he sent to Stanfield's associate and Suraya Manuel in April 2023. Manuel is also the co-director of at least one business with Johnson. During one specific communication with Manuel, Van

Rooyen asked her to send him the company profile of Yibaninati and informed her that Stanfield had told him to contact her about the business's company profile documents. He told her the profile needed to be urgently submitted for a cleaning service tender. This tender was apparently one of the ad hoc tenders that Prasa awarded to Mzansi. Evidence shows that Van Rooyen also gave Manuel his private Gmail address and told her to send Yibaninati's profile to that address. Evidence indicates that she sent him the company profile. Other evidence indicating Van Rooyen's involvement with Stanfield comes from a communication where Manuel told him that he, along with several other associates of the Stanfield-Johnson enterprise, had been summoned to a meeting at an MBT Garage in Bishop Lavis. MBT Garage, which is also known as the John Ramasay Service Station, is owned by the RalCole Family Trust, whose sole trustee is Johnson. It was apparently at this meeting that discussions were held on the further involvement of businesses associated with the Stanfield-Johnson enterprise on Mzansi's Prasa contracts. Please comment.

- 5) Further evidence of your Cape Town branch manager, Riyaaz van Rooyen's interactions and involvement with Stanfield, which allegedly show him aiding in covering up Stanfield's capture of Central Line contracts, is found in a communication he sent in August 2023 to Suraya Manuel. In this specific communication, he told Manuel to expect a call from a person called Neville. Van Rooyen told Manuel that Neville was from Mzansi's head office. Our understanding is that the Neville that Van Rooyen was referring to was Mzansi's operations director, Neville Naidoo. Our evidence also shows that Van Rooyen warned Manuel that Neville was trying to uncover information regarding a quote that had been sent. He specifically told Manuel not to tell Neville that he was the one who had sent the quote. Our understanding from this communication is that Van Rooyen was drafting and tailoring favourable quotes on behalf of Stanfield-linked companies, which were then submitted to Mzansi. Between November 2022 and March 2023, Yibaninanti provided six quotes to Mzansi, while Johnson's company, Glomix House Brokers, submitted two quotes to Mzansi in November 2022. These were for bush clearing and rubble removal, service road maintenance, fencing and bridge construction, and soil poisoning for the removal of vegetation around train stations on the Central Line. We understand that Naidoo was suspicious about using the services of a particular company that Van Rooyen had sourced a quote from. Evidence that we have gathered shows that Stanfield and Johnson's associated companies and people, including his brother, Kyle Stanfield, were involved in clean-up services along the Central Line work. Please comment.
- 6) Further evidence of Mzansi's involvement with Yibaninati can be found in an email Prasa's acting head of security, Alexio Papadopulo, sent on November 10, 2022. The email was sent from Papadopulo's personal iCloud address to Mzansi's assistant finance manager, Sudesh Sewdutt. Yibaninati is copied on the email. The subject line reads: Yibaninati: Contacts and Purchase Orders. In the email, Papadopulo told

Sewdutt that he was emailing him to provide the contact details of the team working on “the reestablishment of the roads, the clean-up and vegetation control.” He then instructs Sewdutt to send the purchase orders based on quotes that had been sent to Mzansi, so work can begin at three different clusters on the Central Line. Importantly, he tells Sewdutt that he had spoken with you about this matter and that you had confirmed that the purchase orders would be sent by November 11, 2022. Papadopulo emphasised to Sewdutt the urgency of this being done because work was scheduled to start on November 14, 2022. He informed him that the contact person to get the site operational was Kyle and provided a cellphone number for him. A consumer trace shows that the number is owned by Kyle Stanfield, the brother of Ralph Stanfield. Kyle Stanfield’s LinkedIn profile shows that he works for Glomix. A consumer trace also indicates that Stanfield works for Glomix, whose sole director is Johnson. As we have pointed out, Yibaninati is also associated with Johnson. Additional evidence that we have gathered shows that Stanfield also had prior knowledge that teams involved in the bush clearing and service road maintenance work were to be on site by November 14, 2022. Importantly, the evidence shows that he had prior knowledge about the contracts that were being drawn up with Mzansi and that the invoices that their associated companies were to send to Mzansi were to be labelled as “facilitating” services. The November 10 email, coupled with the additional information that we have sourced, shows that Mzansi was used to aid the Stanfield-Johnson enterprise to capture service road maintenance, and vegetation and rubble removal contracts that Prasa awarded to Mzansi. Please comment.

- 7) Evidence shows that around March 2023, Stanfield had received information about purchase orders for the supply of skip bins and toilets, relocations, and the construction of bridges and fences. Importantly, he also had information on a piece of land close to Stock Road that had been identified as the place to relocate some of those households living on the Central Line’s railway reserve. The skips and toilets were to be placed on the Stock Road land. One of the ad hoc contracts Prasa awarded to Mzansi was for the eviction and relocation of those living on the rail reserve. Evidence shows Stanfield knew that the relocation contract had been awarded to Mzansi and that he targeted this contract. His associates who were involved in the targeting were Eugene McLaughlin, Teenage Fanie, and Phakamisa Nondabula. Evidence suggests that Yibaninati was used to facilitate opportunities in the relocation process for local companies and communities. This included job opportunities for the construction of foundations on which those who were relocated could build their new homes. Evidence indicates that Stanfield had information on the size of the foundations that were to be constructed, the number of households that were to be relocated, and knew that Mzansi would be working alongside Diphatse Trading and Projects to build these foundations. Evidence also shows that

Johnson's company, Glomix House Brokers, also targeted aspects of the relocation contracts. The company sent two quotes to Mzansi for the construction of bridges and fences. Both were sent on the same day. The first was for R62-million and the second for R82-million. These fences and bridges were to be erected between Nyanga and Philippi train stations. Some of those households that were to be relocated lived on the rail reserve around Philippi train station. Please comment.

Regards